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Abstract 
Establishing respectively the relevant concepts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Hannah Arendt, this thesis links flesh and the inter esse as both bespeaking of a fruitful 
dialectical relationship wherein the new is born by making its visible appearance.  This 
advent of the visible is made possible in differentiation from an implied invisibility, which 
for both authors determines a connection between nature and temporality; nature as related to 
the appearance of the visible as grounded upon temporal implications within the invisible.  
Commensurate temporal structures of the invisible between these authors demonstrate birth 
as institutional (the continuation of a historically contingent sensibility) and institutional 
events as synonymous with re-birth in their natal links to Arendtian action.  Like the act of 
promise that initiates an institution and outlines what it will return to the world, birth satisfies 
the preconditions for action by establishing a spectacular point of intersection with nature’s 
cyclical rule of return.  In this way, the child appears as a metaphor through/of that which his 
or her birth returns to the world, comparable to a cyclical structure analogous with nature’s 
own rule - the noēsis noēseōs of thought in its metaphorical outcomes.   
Keywords 
Merleau-Ponty, Hannah Arendt, Phenomenology, Natality, Birth, Institution, Flesh, Inter 
Esse, Metaphor 
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Epigraph 
Surely some revelation is at hand; 
Surely the Second Coming is at hand. 
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out 
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi 
Troubles my sight: somewhere in the sands of the desert 
A shape with lion body and pitiless as the sun, 
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it 
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds. 
 
The darkness drops again; but now I know 
That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle, 
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, 
Slouches toward Bethlehem to be born? 
 
From The Second Coming 
-W. B. Yeats 
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Introduction 
Despite different departures and aims, the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Hannah Arendt contain many intersections with implications for thinking temporality, 
visibility/invisibility, intersubjectivity, and natality.  By merging our central authors 
within the first three of these categories, our ultimate aim will be a reformulated 
convergence of the last; towards their mutual co-supplementation in a genuine account of 
birth.  Drawing on a homology between Merleau-Pontyan flesh and Arendtian inter esse, 
the borne will show birth to be institutional (the continuation of a historically contingent 
sensibility) insofar as the event/advent exposes an interiority of time.  Inversely, an 
institutional event/sequel will be shown as synonymous with re-birth whereby satisfying 
Arendt’s notion of action in its links to natality, grants a glimpse at physis – nature, 
understood as the normally invisible appearing in the midst of the visibility as a natal 
“miracle” of the birth of being.1   
The first two chapters of this thesis will establish the major relevant concepts of 
Merleau-Ponty and Arendt.  This foundation will put us in a position to link the outlined 
notions of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh and Arendt’s inter esse as both bespeaking of a fruitful 
dialectical relationship wherein the new is born by making its visible appearance. This 
advent of the visible is made possible in differentiation from an implied invisibility which 
for both authors determines a connection between nature and temporality; nature as 
                                                 
1
 Maurce Merleau-Ponty, ed. James M. Edie, Institution and Passivity: Course Notes From the Collège de France 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 7. Hereafter IP. 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 246. Hereafter HC 
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related to the appearance of the visible as grounded upon the temporal implication within 
the invisible.   
The first chapter develops a chronological understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought, threading through its movement involved natal implications.  This chronological 
account includes a rejection of the tacit cogito in its natal analogy and formulation for the 
synergetic body in its relation to flesh and institution.  By virtue of a reversibility upon 
itself from within the world, the synergetic body demonstrates its very corporeality as 
informed by, extending into, and perpetuating flesh – a barely effable threshold as the 
exemplar sensible of a sensibility (cultural, mythological, ideological, and otherwise).  In 
this way flesh will be comparable to the only plausible metaphor for Arendt’s thinking 
ego in its sheer activity – as the very conditioned sensation of being alive.   
The present, opened through the generated chiasm between reversible body and 
world reveals engendered fields and normally invisible routes dormant within flesh itself.  
It is these opened fields and routes followed out which allows for a kind of perpetuating 
intercourse between others with their synergetic bodies and what Merleau-Ponty calls 
institutions. Specifically, institutional sequels will be demonstrated as moments whereby 
flesh can appear in making visible the constitutive invisible temporality contained in the 
now.  Comparable to what Arendt outlines as appearing physis (the invisible in the midst 
of the visible and the totality of all things), these events are witnessed by a 
Rückgestaltung effected between body (or bodies) and reflection which fissures flesh in 
its very temporality to reveal a temporal index proper to the time that is – the institutional 
Stiftung as a chiasm whereby a past and present are made visibly Ineinander, enveloping-
enveloped.  Charged as they are, such institutional sequels will be those “events in an 
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experience which endow the experience with durable dimensions…which deposit a sense 
in me…as the call to follow, the demand of a future.” (IP x)  As we will show in our third 
chapter, it is an intercourse between synergetic bodies, the intermingling of our flesh as 
the cause of institutional re-birth, demonstrated as synonymous with the emergence of 
nature anew or the birth of being at revealed physis. 
In our second chapter, we will have the opportunity to work towards a 
supplementation of Merleau-Ponty’s natal thread, abandoned with the tacit cogito in its 
natal formulation, towards a vague and unspecified reformulation already suggested in 
the shift towards flesh and institution.  Here, Arendt direct reflections on natality in its 
relationship to action will prove invaluable insofar as the latter’s outlined preconditions 
remind us that of all human activities “action has the closest connection with the human 
condition of natality.” (HC 9)  In this way our second chapter will establish the inter esse 
as the well-spring of dynamic possibility between persons.
2
  The inter esse will be 
precisely that location where aimed action delays an otherwise mortal trajectory by 
intersecting with nature’s eternal cycle in the advent of the new; an instance of revealed 
physis to be expanded within the cycling noēsis noēseōs of the thinking ego.  It is the 
deep temporal structure exposed within the noēsis noēseōs which makes its metaphorical 
re-turn a tangent whereby nature itself, as what is between persons, is reconfigured in its 
appearance as the new.   
                                                 
2
 In following the philosophic tradition, Arendt speaks of the inter esse as the in-between of men or that which is 
between men.  For our purposes, use of “men” would expose a limit and an insensitivity when considering, as we will, 
the act of giving birth.  In other words, to say the birth of a child happens “between men” is more than just inaccurate.  
We further do not wish to limit the emergence of the new beyond the birth of children to men alone.   In some instances 
we have attempted to stay close to Arendt’s language, but for the reasons just mentioned have in those cases which are 
not direct quotes changed “man” or “men” to persons or some other variant.    
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In our final chapter, we will make commensurate flesh and inter esse.  Initially it 
will be Arendt’s continual emphasis on the appearance of physis, situated in its own 
institutional expansion within the noēsis noēseōs of contemplated Being, that we link 
with Merleau-Ponty’s passing reflections on nature.  This puts our author’s on a common 
term inherently institutional/indicative of our having been conditioned, while locating the 
Stiftung of appearing physis, an institution in sequel, and visibility.  Our major 
convergence will follow wherein the outlined temporal invisibility of flesh, necessary for 
perception and institutional sequel, is demonstrated as convergent with the since shifted 
and metaphorically returned point of cyclical completion found in Arendt; from that 
normally invisible physis made visible by action’s intersection and natal outcome with 
the cyclicality of nature, to the invisibility of the thinking in its cyclical, mnemonic, and 
visible return as a metaphor indicative of the birth of being in the present which appears 
“like a miracle.” (HC 246)  Solidified by commensurate invisibilities in their intimate 
relationships to temporality as contingent for the visible (as nature and the emergence of 
the new), the link between the asymmetrical sequel of institution, to the re-cycling of 
mnemonic metaphors from the life of the mind equates both flesh and inter esse as 
conditions for the institution of our nature and the inter esse itself. 
Having made commensurate flesh and inter esse, the third chapter will outline an 
exposed and shared temporal absence of the present between our central authors 
necessary for our reformulation of birth; for Merleau-Ponty, a “quasi-eternity” of lived 
instants between times exchanged and the eternity of the nunc stans as taken up by 
Arendt.  Reflection on their shared temporal structure yields a shared sense of divergence 
or decentering indicative of the present as being a certain absence. 
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Finally, it is within these commensurate temporal structures and absences that we 
explicate the mechanisms for institutional sequel, an enigma kept in reserve giving 
impetus for the rebirth of institution and inversely demonstrating birth as institutional.  In 
this way, both birth and institution will harbor miraculous newness.  This will be 
explicated through the example of an institution of love begun by the initial action of 
promise - that which will perpetuate the institution itself.  This example allows us to 
directly take up the birth of a child.  Indeed, birth, like a promise in what it returns to the 
world, will be shown as satisfying the preconditions for action - that human activity 
linked to natality by intersecting with nature in its cyclical processes outlining the child 
as a kind of returned metaphor comparable to analogous cyclical return within noēsis 
noēseōs of thought.  
Because birth necessarily occurs in plurality, emerges from in-between persons, 
and commences the disclosure to the question of ‘who?’, birth will be seen as aimed at 
and an upsurge within the inter esse or a passing into flesh, bearing the former’s peculiar 
structure of dissemination; like one’s “who” witnessed only by others, birth is 
paradoxically one’s and yet never an event witnessed in their life, an invisible origin that 
is never fully appropriable.  In addition to being an action, this birth will qualify as an 
institutional sequel, simultaneously decentering the established institution which the 
borne is equally inaugurated within.  This inauguration as the entrance of the new is an 
institutional event insofar as its overcoming preserves yet reconfigures the invisibility 
prior to its very advent.    
The invisibility of our origin and birth will be foundational for all subsequent 
invisibilities involved in the reckoning with our differentiated and unfolding visible 
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present.  Thus, we conclude, that by virtue of a kind of recession of invisibility, birth as 
the flesh from which we pass, commensurate with an instance of physis or institutional 
sequel, is always the unfolding into the Merleau-Pontyan flesh of those others whose 
appearance in ek-stasis was like a lifelong preparation for our arrival. 
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Chapter One: Merleau-Ponty 
1:1 Body and World on the Way to Meaning: Tacit Cogito 
A person appeared to him in his sleep, and saluting him by his name, said 
“Caedmon, sing some song to me.”...”What shall I sing?” he rejoined.  “Sing 
the beginning of created beings,” said the other.  Hereupon he presently 
began to sing verses to the praise of God, which he had never heard...He sang 
the creation of the world, the origins of man, and all the history of Genesis... 
-St. Bede, Ecclesiastical History of the English Nation
3
 
In our first chapter, we will begin a brief chronological explication of Merleau-
Ponty’s thought beginning with the introduction of the tacit cogito, “myself [silently] 
experienced by myself” under the “chatter of words.” 4   In its attempt to bridge a 
body/mind divide that the Cartesian ontology grossly parsed in misrepresentation of its 
own sensorial experience, and in its simultaneous attempt to reconcile our direct 
experience with the world and meaningful transaction with others, the tacit cogito points 
towards the precarious threshold indicating the entrance of the new in its natal 
formulation: “the infant at its first breath.” (PhP 470)  Brought new into the world at this 
continued “first breath” is the possibility of meaningful speech from silent signification, 
an expression born from the depths of a body loaded in spatio-temporal anteriority, 
cradled within one’s silent perceptual stand and a silence of consciousness embracing the 
world of speech in which “words first receive form and meaning.” (PhP 469)  
                                                 
3
 St. Bede, trans. L.C. Jane, Ecclesiastical History of the English Nation, (New York, NY: Everyman’s Library, 1978). 
4
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, trans. Colin Smith, Phenomenology of Perception, (New York, NY: Routledge Classics, 
2002), 469. Hereafter PhP.   
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Insofar as the silent embrace of the tacit cogito is the continued mediator between 
incarnated body-world and speech, every subsequent expression signals a “being born 
again” such that the continually pregnant present in its spatio-temporal acquisition 
brought to term “is irreducible and the arrival of every moment changes its predecessor.” 
(PhP 457/469)  This configuration is meant to confirm the time that is, the body/world 
co-incarnation, and thought in a mutual punctuality of the now.  In its natal implications 
as “the infant at its first breath,” birth is the spontaneous interruption of the new; the 
spontaneous entrance of someone who was nothing to a newly delivered significance as 
consciousness’ confirmation of the world in a full plenitude over-against which its 
entrance stands. (PhP 470)  Conceptually, this birth is an “openness of a future, from a 
background of non-being from which what was projects itself” such that it “arises from 
nothing.” (IP 8)  The tacit cogito along with such a formulation of birth will for reasons 
explored be abandoned.        
Through the celebrated chapter The Body as Expression, and Speech we are invited 
to follow that strategic “double refusal” so characteristic of Merleau-Ponty in his critical 
engagements with text: refuting either of two seemingly unavoidable philosophical 
choices to assess the remainder as a starting point or position for further thought.
5
  With 
this technique’s employment in tackling the problems inherent in both modern 
empiricism and intellectualism, we find both schools are refuted by demonstrating one as 
merely the mirror of the other, that both require their reflected counterpart for foundation, 
                                                 
5 This strategic ‘double refutation’ was first brought to my attention by the works of Robert Vallier whose commentary 
on Merleau-Ponty has proved invaluable.  In particular his essay Institution: The Significance of Merleau-Ponty’s 1954 
Course at the Collège de France.  See specifically: Robert Vallier, Institution: The Significance of Merleau-Ponty’s 
1954 Course at the Collège de France, in Chiasmi International Vol. 7: Life and Individuation, ed. Renaud Barbaras, 
Mauro Carbone, Helen A. Fielding, Leonard A. Lawlor, (Memphis, TN: Clinamen Press, 2005), 282. Hereafter RVI.   
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and finally, that both subjected to the same criticism are “not solved by going from one 
extreme to the other.” (PhP 205)   
The empirical and intellectual accounts of meaning are “one in holding that the 
word has no significance.” (PhP 205)  They deny engagement as a speaking agent and 
ultimately agency itself.  The empiricist offering a mechanics of neurological stimuli or 
psychological association triggering speech as an effect, renders the spoken response 
impotent as the bearer its own meaning, leaves it and the speaking subject no “inner 
power” and presumes a possibility of meaning’s unequivocal mapping within a given 
order of scientific causality. (PhP 205)  The intellectualist philosophy differs little 
wherein one “duplicate[s] denomination with a categorical operation.” (PhP 205)  The 
word is left lame, being only an external sign of an internal recognition.  Here, “[i]t is not 
without meaning, since behind it there is a categorial operation, but this meaning is 
something which it does not have...the word remaining an empty container.” (PhP 205)  
As Merleau-Ponty concludes, “In the first...we are on this side of the word as meaningful; 
in the second we are beyond it.   In the first there is nobody to speak; in the second, there 
is certainly a subject, but a thinking one, not a speaking one.” (PhP 205)   
It follows that both schools of thinking lead into a relativism that their sciences 
hoped to circumvent.  The empirical thinker apprehends others in their speech-acts as 
causal effects, leaving them caught in a machine like mechanism. The intellectualist, 
assuming a coincidental quality between him, his ultimate interiority, and his meaning 
fails to empower either himself or any subject with the means necessary to guarantee 
contact with others or the openness onto which perception dawns.  From subjective 
10 
 
isolation, he is left to assume a monopoly on meaning that constructs the way of the 
world in solipsistic projections.   
The solipsism of our isolated intellectualist becomes equally true of his empiricist 
counterpart when their limits reveal the two as interchangeable.  The empiricist, 
considering his body as subjected to his own suggested mechanistic causality makes 
untenable his own explanation, leaving unaccountable his transcendent capacity which 
allows him to speak “from the outside” of the implied causal order.  Hence, the 
transcendental mark of intellectualism.  The intellectualist becomes equally 
indistinguishable from the empiricist: “Once the categorial operation is performed, the 
appearance of the word...has to be explained...by recourse to a physiological or psychic 
mechanism, since the word is a passive shell” marking the intellectualist’s dependency on 
empiricism.  (PhP 208) 
The failure of empiricism and intellectualism as demonstrated by this analysis 
indicates that both are overcome by affirming what they deny, that the word has a 
meaning and speech a gestural sense.  As remainder and starting point for further 
thought, sense is induced by the words spoken, whose “... conceptual meaning must be 
formed by a kind of deduction from [the] gestural meaning, which is immanent in 
speech.” (PhP 208)  By following this reduction, we have been taken from “higher 
altitude thinking” of a theoretical gaze to an experiencing subject that finds him or herself 
“in a situation” that is meaningful. (PhP 475)   
This reduction from a theoretical approach to speech to encountering meaning its 
very lived situation is perhaps best illustrated by John Berger’s example of progressing 
11 
 
sketch, having begun as a white page whose progressive genesis and cumulative internal 
reference involves moments of “confirmation or denial [which] bring you closer to the 
object, until finally you are, as it were, inside it: the contours you have drawn no longer 
marking the edge of what you have seen, but the edge of what you have become.”6 Listen 
now to Merleau-Ponty reflect on the same act:  “We have seen that what occurs is clearly 
not a purely manual operation, the actual movement of my hand and pen over the 
paper...”  The drawing is “a gesture...the lines drawn are the outward expression of an 
intention...which is for me a set of lines with a certain orientation.” (PhP 449)  It is in the 
act of drawing that one places themselves at a point from where potential trajectories can 
begin to come into view.  By following up on one’s initial orientation (which is not the 
steady-handed tracing of a figure presented to the mind’s eye) one anticipates the course 
that their pen must take.  It is because the figure from the outset is a dynamic possibility 
that, “...enables the conclusion to be reached...[the conclusion] not really contained in the 
essence of the triangle, but merely possible when that essence serves as a starting point.” 
(PhP 447)  There is a coincidental relationship between one and one’s perception-of as 
the punctuation of now in all its dynamic possibility.  In this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s 
reduction bring us to a beginning analogous with Berger’s “what you have become”, that 
becoming already involved in a preemptive essence and not merely a being as a “thing 
seen.”  
That this link suggests that one is coincidental with one’s perception-of as the 
punctuation of what is now in its dynamic possibility does not quite fully answer the 
                                                 
6
 John Berger, “Drawing” in Selected Essays, (New York, NY: Vintage International, 2002), 10.  
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riddle.  What it does suggest is that “our hold on the world” in perceptual intentionality is 
equivocal with “the world’s hold on us” in a shared mutuality.  If now the question 
concerns the intersection of these mutual “holds”, the analysis has arrived at the point of 
contact between them as the abode of perception that qualifies being “in a situation” – the 
“living body.” (PhP 87)  “I cannot understand the function of the living body except by 
enacting it myself, and except in so far as I am a body which rises towards the world.” 
(PhP 87)   
If indeed meaning is accessible and the world open, it can be only by mutually 
opening on one’s corporeality in the world: “If the subject is in a situation, even if he is 
no more than a possibility of situations, this is because he forces his ipseity into reality 
only by actually being a body, and entering the world through that body.” (PhP 475)  
Within this structure, an initial expressive movement links-up to farther points and reliefs 
to which one tends along its expressive trajectory, is confirmed within the sensation of its 
very movement, and is understood by the corresponding spatiality, attitude, and 
“posturing” of one’s body as the grounds for its very arch.   
As impetus for an act then, there is thus, the movements of our body prior to 
movement initiated in the expressive moment itself, a carried over spatial anteriority 
engaged in and brought to bear in perceptual experience as the outcome of our reckoning 
with the world; Kant’s hypothesized “motion that generates space.” (PhP 450)  
Epistemologically speaking, that one retains the capacity to employ or carry through 
within lived situations such outwardly expressive intention/movement can solely be 
based on the activation of a retentional and anticipatory quality with which one’s body is 
endowed. 
13 
 
Indeed, a constituting consciousness could never completely synthesize a course 
or object at which its trajectory is aimed.  An object is not a judgment whereby I link 
together successive perspectives unto completion.  Insofar as each individual aspect given 
to consciousness requires accountability within its own synthesis - a process further 
divided unto infinity - constituting consciousness precludes the possibility of synthesis 
before it even begins.  Perception of an object is given, concordant with my body’s 
perspectival stance, “aspects intended but not possessed in the present perception…kept 
in reserve.”7 For “...if each six sides of a transparent cube were visible as square, it is not 
a cube we would be seeing.” (SB 218)  This would be a point of view presupposing that 
perspectives in simultaneity – “a pure contradiction in terms.” (SB 212)    Thus, a 
synthesis of the unseen sides, of an object’s “concordant phenomena”, is not an 
incomprehensible synthesis performed by constituting consciousness, but is “the formula 
of an attitude, a certain modality of my hold on the world…” like the dynamic possibility 
of the geometric shape that my body with pen in hand is about to exploit through an 
anteriority it carries forward and makes good on. (PhP 449)  In its behavior, the body 
links such “concordant phenomena” - “logical significations bound up with my actual 
perceptions on valid ‘grounds’” - giving the “index of the real existence” and real 
possibility. (PhP 449)  The body is endowed; not an “I think” but opened bodily powers 
as an “I can” in the situation before me: 
The part played by the body in memory is comprehensible only if memory is, 
not only the constituting consciousness of the past, but an effort to reopen 
time on the basis of the implications contained in the present, and if the body, 
as our permanent means of ‘taking up attitudes’ and thus constructing 
                                                 
7
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour (New York, NY: Beacon Press, 1963), 212.  Hereafter SB. 
14 
 
pseudo-presents, is the medium of our communication with time as well as 
with space. (PhP 210) 
There is a link then, established between the body’s spatial anteriority with the 
time that it was, a temporal anteriority with which the body is equally endowed.  It is a 
history I have and future this history opens in possibility in its perceptual and experiential 
outcome in confrontation with the world.  It is a temporal richness accounting for 
perception that provides me with a “perceptual faith” of the world in accumulating 
spatio-temporal structures.  Body and object mirror one another to become “the same in 
kind as each other.” (PhP 305/215)  One is “involved with things with [their] body” and 
they “co-exist” as “incarnate subject”: (PhP 215)  
I arrive at an eidos: it is because I perform the synthesis of the new property 
by means of my body which immediately implants me in space, while its 
autonomous motion enables me, through a series of definite procedures, to 
arrive once more at an all-inclusive view of space...[I]t is from the world of 
perception that I borrow the notion of essence. (PhP 452) 
Thus, “[t]he identity of the thing through perceptual experience is only another 
aspect of the identity of one’s own body through exploratory movements.” (PhP 215)  As 
a perceptual intersection the body finds itself involved in an “existential system of 
exchanges and ‘equivalences’” wherein I perceive the world and tacitly, my body’s 
alignment towards it.
8
  It is by this body that I encounter myself, the body I am, and 
object in combined full plenitude; their relationship to one another through my very 
assessment of their arrangement insofar as I am in equivalency with the perception from 
which it arises: “to the extent that it [our body] is inseparable from a view of the world 
                                                 
8
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ed. John Wild, Signs (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 176. Hereafter 
Signs. 
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and is that view itself brought into existence, is the condition of possibility...of all 
expressive operation and all acquired views which constitute the cultural world.” (PhP 
452)  Perception arises between my comportment and the world it addresses held in a 
mutuality, the world inhabiting us as we do it: “inside...[as] the edge of what you have 
become.”9  Hence, I am able to think the world as the world is able to, as Cézanne said, 
“think itself in me.”10  It is in this silent intersection wherein “the act by which I lend 
myself to the spectacle…is recognized as irreducible to anything else,” and from where 
expression takes flight that we begin to glimpse the tacit cogito. (PhP 216)   
Now touching on the tacit cogito and concerning the problem of meaning, we 
note that neither body nor world think and speak.  Thus far our analysis has affirmed a 
communicative system of incarnate equivalencies between a body and object, (“...the 
identity of the thing through perceptual experience [being]...only another aspect of the 
identity of one’s own body...”)  affirmed by a body’s part played in memory as “the 
medium of communication with time as well as space.” (PhP 210)   Left unexplained by 
this analysis is the linguistic identity of objects given not to a body, but mediated by this 
silent intersection between them. To put the question in Merleau-Ponty’s own words: 
“The problem is how I can be the constituting agent of my thought in general...since I 
never see them come into being in the full light of day, but merely know myself through 
them.”   (PhP 446)  In order to account for consciousness, Merleau-Ponty concedes and 
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affirms “beneath the chatter of words, [a] primordial silence” from which words find their 
very source. (PhP 214)  
This is commensurate with the above analysis of both empiricism and 
intellectualism: to speak or understand cannot be to translate or decipher a pure ideal 
language implicit in oneself or others.  Analogous to the problem of conscious synthesis, 
if one had to translate “pure” thought from its own order into speech, one would never be 
able to speak, all attempts encountering only more “empty containers” who are in turn 
need of translation. Thought without speech would fall into oblivion before being thought 
itself and thus the word must be “present with no other consciousness behind it to grasp 
at its being.” (PhP 493)  Thus, if the affirmed gestural sense is necessary for the 
deduction of “conceptual meaning” implied in the spoken word, it can only be so if the 
word echoes “the external existence of the sense”. (PhP 211)  In their mutual inter-
anticipation, thought (never pure), and speech (never without thought), must aim to 
“transform a certain kind of silence into speech.” (PhP 214)    
With the bridge between the existential equivalents of body and world unclear, 
Merleau-Ponty is forced to concede that language itself, “presupposes nothing less than a 
consciousness of language, a silence of consciousness embracing the world of speech in 
which words first receive a form and meaning...” (PhP 469)  Thus, we arrive at the tacit 
cogito, “myself experienced by myself” under the “chatter of words” in silence. (PhP 
469)  It is the glimpse one catches of oneself independently of any particular act, 
independently of any words spoken.  It is not the cogito in its spoken form.  It is rather a 
“silent cogito [as] the one Descartes sought when writing his Meditations.” (PhP 468)  
17 
 
Behind the spoken cogito...there lies a tacit cogito, myself experienced by 
myself.  But this subjectivity, indeclinable, has upon itself and upon the world 
only a precarious hold.  It does not constitute the world, it divines the world’s 
presence round about it as a field not provided by itself; not does it constitute 
the word, but speaks as we sing when we are happy... (PhP 469) 
Not quite body and not yet spoken, this “I see that I see”, functions to translate the 
passive mute end of bodily synthesis and the expressive gesture that takes off from this 
orientation.   And thus we return to our section’s opening example: Caedmon when called 
upon in his passive sleep by an apparition sang “the creation of the world, the origins of 
man, and the history of all Genesis.”11  And Caedmon was left astounded and in awe at 
the verses and praise from his own mouth and body which he had never heard.  Sartre is 
correct to say that speaking “teaches us...our own thought” but only if we only lend 
ourselves to this precarious dawning, this silence of consciousness embracing the world 
of speech, this “inarticulate grasp on the world, like that of the infant at its first breath...” 
(Signs 17/PhP 470)   
It is here with the advent of the tacit cogito that we are introduced to our first 
natal analogy for the coming to terms of meaning an embodied life: “…that of the infant 
at its first breath.” (PhP 470)  Aligned with spontaneous interruption of the tacit cogito, 
birth is suggested as the entrance of someone who was not there, who was nothing, to a 
newly delivered significance as consciousness’ confirmation of the world over-against 
which their entrance stands.   
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1:2 Rejection of the Tacit Cogito Towards Flesh and Institution 
From within a dream, Caedmon answered a call with question and then 
miraculously sang.  His hymn echoed the creation of the world, the origin of man, and the 
history of all Genesis.  He sang “the sense but not the words as he sang them in his sleep; 
for verses, though never so well composed, cannot be literally translated out of one 
language into another.” 12  If the language of his dreams and the language of his waking 
world “cannot be literally translated” nor could we add could the divine request. We 
begin then, by noting that the oneiric calling is comparable to the experience of the tacit 
cogito, an awakening to a gestural sense called for from a certain silence found beneath 
that “chatter of words.” (PhP 214)   
Upon waking Caedmon informed his brothers at the Streaneshalch monastery of 
his visitation: “They all concluded that heavenly grace had been conferred on him by our 
Lord.”13  We are invited to preemptively introduce Arendt here as she reminds us that the 
spontaneous nature of thought is probably “the aboriginal source of our notion of 
spirituality in itself.”14  It was indeed such a thinking capacity towards Self-conferral, 
crossing a certain threshold that Kant confessed as the reason for proof of a 
transcendental “in-itself” order and subsequent appearance towards a two-world theory: 
“in the consciousness of myself in the sheer thinking activity, I am the thing itself 
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although nothing of myself is thereby given for thought.” 15  Hence, Kant sought to 
understand the limitations of our reason and senses between parallel orders of the 
Noumenal as what cannot appear but causes the latter phenomenal order of appearances: 
“The thinking ego is indeed Kant’s ‘thing in itself’: it does not appear to others and, 
unlike the self of self-awareness, it does not appear to itself, and yet it is ‘not nothing.’” 
(LM 42)     
Note the similarities between the tacit cogito and thinking ego, mediating an 
entrance or passage between two mutually exclusive orders that their very advent divide.  
For commensurate with the tacit cogito and Kant’s self-concealing self-representation 
with the orders it implies, is that this sudden crossing from an invisible process, dealing 
in invisibilities, can only be described by examples of metaphor latent to the crossing 
itself.  This is why Kant tells us that “nothing of myself is thereby given for thought” 
indicating self directed intentionality as the reception of representation, a metaphorical 
appearance caused by its concealed grounds.
 16
 According to Arendt: 
...the chief difficulty here seems to be that for thinking itself – whose 
language is entirely metaphorical and whose conceptual framework depends 
entirely on the gift of metaphor, which bridges the gulf between the visible 
and invisible, the world of appearances and the thinking ego - there exists no 
metaphor that could plausibly illuminate this special activity of the mind, in 
which something invisible within us deals with the invisibles of the world.  
All difficulties drawn from the senses will lead us into difficulties for the 
simple reason that all our senses are essentially cognitive, hence, if 
understood as activities, have an end outside themselves; they 
are...instruments enabling us to know and deal with the world. (LM 123) 
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If indeed, “in the consciousness of myself in the sheer thinking activity, I am the 
thing itself although nothing of myself is thereby given for thought” we follow our 
analogy by saying that in the consciousness of the tacit cogito, it is the purported 
experience itself although nothing of the experience it purports is thereby given by its 
intended formulation with which it is charged the task of making possible.  Like Kant’s 
thinking ego, any intentional act towards the tacit cogito results in the concealment and 
subsequent reception of metaphorical representation of that very experience which caused 
its appearance: “What I call the tacit cogito is impossible.  To have the idea of ‘thinking’ 
(in the sense of the ‘thought of seeing and feeling’), to make the ‘reduction,’ to return to 
immanence and to the consciousness of…it is necessary to have words.”17   
Indeed, words need be presupposed.  Having been outlined as that silent cradle of 
consciousness from “which words first receive a form and meaning...” the tacit cogito 
remains charged with the task of mediating the mute synthesis between body and world 
to the level of a language which must already be established. (PhP 469)  Analogous then, 
with “…consciousness…seen as the peak of an iceberg, a mere indication of the floating 
mass of unconsciousness beneath it” the tacit cogito is unable to be demonstrated in its 
own terms: “the moment a fragment of unconsciousness reaches the peak of the iceberg it 
has become conscious and lost all the properties of its alleged origin.” (LM 113)  
Likewise, the tacit cogito as pre-linguistic mediator is betrayed in its explicit formulation 
having lost “properties of its alleged origin” distributed in the language it is meant to 
explain and unable to account for itself as the mediator from silence to speech. (LM 113)  
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Hence: “[t]he tacit cogito should make understood how language is not impossible, but 
cannot make understood how it is possible – There remains the problem of the passage 
from the perceptual meaning to the language meaning, from behavior to thematization.” 
(VI 175) In the intending of the tacit cogito, it not only loses all properties of its alleged 
silent origin, it preemptively precludes its very function in the linguistic body it finds 
itself formulated in. 
  It is from this first negative touchstone of foundational truth at home in the I see 
that I see that makes the tacit source for speech impossible to explicate without an 
infidelity to its purported function.  The “truth” of perception is not only ineffable by 
definition but precludes the possibility of definition.  It is as though one is unable to both 
unable to “see and grasp” this truth, “like children trying to catch smoke by closing their 
hands.” 18   Pursuit of a solution to this metaphysical quandary has oscillated in the 
philosophic tradition between metaphors of sight and hearing (Job 42:5, About God: “I 
have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear: but now mine eye seeth
19
) but found its final 
bastion in an example of the latter:  “[I]n Heidegger the moment of illumination is 
understood as “lightning” (Blitz), and finally replaced by an altogether different 
metaphor...”the ringing sound of silence.”” (LM 122)  Heidegger’s metaphor brings us 
closer insofar as hearing seems the other passive side of speech and cognition.  But 
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hearing as the idea of pure passivity will always remain in opposition with the sheer act 
of thinking (“the silent dialogue of me with myself”). (LM 122)    
Thus, whereas the thinking ego led Kant into reckoning assumed parallel orders, 
the tacit cogito despite its return to the world is no different.  The body in its mute 
synthesis of those aforementioned “concordant phenomena…(aspects intended but not 
possessed in the present perception)…” demonstrated that the past is not declinable nor 
over; its presence in the present as bodily habit such that “the conscious present is an 
awareness of the past in a way and to an extent which the past’s awareness of itself 
cannot show.”20 (SB 212)  As I move towards the world, carried with me, like a thread 
through a needle are those instantaneous cross-sections of my times previously passed 
through towards their integration within the silent perceptual present as the confrontation 
of being and myself.  And indeed, this “affecting of self by self” solicit us deeper into 
accumulating spatio-temporal thickness of our mutual unfolding relationship with the 
identity of the object or world such that the present in its temporal acquisition is 
irreducible and the arrival of every moment changes its predecessors.”21 (PhP 494/457)   
Yet, this outcome occurs only when the body “catches itself from the outside in a 
cognitive process...[that] initiates a ‘kind of reflection’”, the tacit cogito receiving only 
the end of this mute synthesis, the object is “perceived as a residue” rather than in its 
“ontological originality.” (PhP 107/RVI 284)  That the continually pregnant present in its 
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spatio-temporal acquisition brought to expression was “irreducible [such that] the arrival 
of every moment changes its predecessor” was the confirmation that the time that is - 
body/world and thought - were pushed up in a monopolized punctuality of the now. (PhP 
457)  Yet this read carnal immediacy “undercuts the punctuality of the cogito, which we 
saw as fundamental to it.”22     
   Distributed it in the language it is meant to explain, the problem stems from a 
philosophic formulation beginning with “consciousness of-“ conceived of as an empty 
and relative consciousness as prior to consciousness itself - “entirely outside itself by 
exactly coextensive with being.” (IP 5)  Indeed, “[e]xistentially speaking, Parmenides 
was wrong when he said that only Being manifests itself in, and is the same as, thinking.  
Non-being is also thinkable if the will commands the mind…and nothingness becomes a 
full substitute for reality.” (LM 157)  The tacit cogito as the thought of seeing and feeling 
is precisely this fallacious importation of what is otherwise an absence in the full 
positivity of conceptual thought.  As such, as the idea of thinking, the tacit cogito as pre-
linguistic mediator is, to reiterate, betrayed in its explicit formulation having lost not only 
“properties of its alleged origin” but likewise a precluding on the very function to which 
it purports. (LM 113)     
Thus, we run the risk of describing badly if our positing of a tacit cogito as the 
thought of seeing in its very absence leads us to admit a “”subjective component’...[that] 
comes to cover over the things themselves: it is not a matter of another layer or veil that 
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would have come to pose itself between them [the world and others] and me.”23  Such a 
subjective component does not quite abort the spontaneity of birth, but makes it such that 
the borne never truly leaves the womb of solipsistic projections.  Like the received 
representation of the tacit cogito that conceals its very experienced source, to have the 
idea of our birth gives only a metaphorical representation within words that were not 
available at the event itself – an event that is in fact not an event in our lives.  In this 
projected womb, like the intellectualist caught in his interiorized categorical operations, 
there can be “no truth, nor falsity” to the certain silence as an infant’s first breath.  It is 
assumed “as soon as it [the birth from silence] is felt, it is true.  And it is never true as 
conformity to nature or to a destiny.”24  In other words, it is free in the sense of lacking 
all contingencies by which to orient it or to explain its freedom.    
Rather, we should “not thinking it [the negative] as negative if we treat it as an 
‘object of thought’ or try to say what it is: that is to make of it a more subtle or more 
rarefied species of being, it is to reintegrate it into being.” (VI 6) Merleau-Ponty remarks, 
“It is the naiveté that rends itself sunder in the night.  Between Being in itself and the 
‘interior life’ it does not even catch sight of the problem of the world.  Whereas it is 
toward that problem that we are making our way.” (VI 6)  And it is here that we leave our 
first natal analogy of the tacit cogito towards the means for a reformulation of birth.     
*  *  *  *  *  * 
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Insofar as we saw a punctuality to the cogito undercut, a punctuation that was 
fundamental to it, a notion was needed that would remain faithful to “the interplay of 
presence and absence as prior to those apparently constitutive elements”, a notion that 
would not put speech over a silence its very words break and would not put reflection 
over against an unthinkable unreflected. (BA 212)  This subsequent introduction was 
flesh: “…not a concept…barely even a word or notion,” a barely effable threshold as the 
exemplar sensible of sensibility as comparable to the very conditioned sensation of being 
alive.
25
  It is an “interiorly worked-over man, [that] has no name in philosophy” but is 
rather the unconscious conditions from which we think, act, and speak as sedimented in 
their temporality and carried  through to the time that is. 
Flesh, then, is not latent or prior to our body but located in its very 
accomplishments:  “The flesh is the body inasmuch as it is the visible seer, the audible 
hearer, the tangible touch – the sensitive sensible: inasmuch as in it is accomplished an 
equivalence of sensibility and sensible thing.” (VI Iiv)  It is an anchor for our body then, 
a body that accomplishes this very sensibility in a reversibility upon itself opening to the 
perceptual fields it harbors within.  Something opened and moved through, “…to 
designate it [flesh] we should need the old term ‘element’…in the sense of a general 
thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate 
principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being.” (VI 139)  
Thus, flesh is that which bodies both institute and perpetuate in their transitivity towards 
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a horizon opened within the possibilities of flesh, a movement fed back into what is its 
temporal sedimentation of its being the exemplar sensible.    
Of this body however, “one can indeed say [of my body] that is not elsewhere, but 
one cannot say that it is here or now in the sense that objects are.” (VI 147)  As an 
elemental unconscious then “…my flesh as gangue of my perception has taught me that 
perception does not come to birth just anywhere, that it emerges in the recess of a body.” 
(VI 8)   
This new “synergetic body” maintains anteriority as a recessional temporal index 
of its ontological registers, opened through solicitations of the world between which 
raises the flesh.  We say then, of this “synergetic body” that it is the perpetuator of flesh 
insofar as it continually moves through its own recessional absence into the unfolding of 
the elemental latter by a performed reversibility in the world, ushering in perception of 
fields and perpetuated passageways harbored within flesh’s expanding thickness (spatial, 
cultural, mythological, ideological, and as domains of knowledge).    
It is this recessional index accessed by the synergetic body in a reversibility upon 
itself – a Gestalt the world invited by Rückgestaltung that results in “an openness upon a 
field of Gestalttungen – And this means that perception is unconscious.” (VI 189/243)  
This movement presents a halo of possibilities and possible fields into which with our 
bodies we might enter: “The lived body has an outstanding experience of the Gestalt 
because the system it sets up is arranged around a central axis, a hinge, which is openness 
to the Gestalt and at once a component of it.  The subject holds sway over its lived body 
both as a system of actual positions and as ‘an open system of an infinite number of 
27 
 
equivalent positions directed to other ends.’”26  We are invited to think of Rilke’s Spanish 
dancer, who generating “her own fire” with solicited bodily gestures opens an inferno and 
decidedly steps through the flames to stamp the fire out.
27
  Within the chiasm of 
reversible body and horizonally surrounding world flesh opens into fields that appear and 
transcend us; “the sensible world full of gaps, ellipses, allusions; objects are 
‘physiognomies,’ ‘behaviour,’” and these resulting Gestaltungen means “…my whole 
unconscious perception at each moment is only the relation of a human action…” 
towards which my body is already being involved in a world that is being overcome. (IP 
124)   
To be sure, this movement of the Rückgestaltung is carried through into the 
movements of the fields opened within flesh.  The spatial analogy of a field points us 
towards a horizon at its peripheral edge, orienting and outlining the field in its 
possibilities of visibility and movement.  Indeed, the Rückgestaltung opens the field in its 
forever fleeting vanishing point, the zero degree of our visibility such that “the space 
beyond what is actually presented us is still presented in experience, already experienced 
by us.”28  We have mentioned that perception is unconscious and is only insofar as “the 
space beyond” the horizon not only is still presented in experience as its invisible outline, 
is that upon which visibility is differentiated for space of the field, spatial and otherwise.  
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Like Cézanne’s objects the horizon is a “contour…the ideal limit towards which the sides 
of the apple recede in depth” whereby the visible “subtly illuminated from within, [and] 
light emanates from it” by virtue of a peripheral swelling of colors leading into their 
indistinctness. (SNS 15/12)  
  But this indistinctness of the beyond, not forever concealed but still presented in 
and outlining experience itself is precisely flesh as the unconscious periphery between 
body and world.  It the chiasm of the unconscious recessional index of our body in its 
ontological registers and the world, there exists a spatio-temporal quotient beyond 
visibility and constitutive of it, creating a “cohesion without concept” wherein time opens 
before our eyes in a differentiated vibration upon temporality, echoing “in the totality of 
the world”, and harmonizing and inverting its accumulating contingencies as we make 
our way through the field it presents.  The field then “straddles its future, has its future, 
its temporality…” and the “sensible thing” like our body “…is not in the here and in the 
now, but it is not intemporal and a-spatial either, an ideality.  It presides over a region, it 
is a field being.” (IP 8/VI 218)  Both scene and object harbor inner and outer temporal 
horizons.  Each bears their own epoch, touched upon at the horizonal vanishing point as a 
no-longer within the not-yet in ek-stasis, including times of the time that it is being 
enveloped-enveloping in our very movement: “[b]ackwards, gazing at a point in the 
distance, but moving away from it, walking straight into the unknown.”29    
    The time that is the field then, differentiated upon this temporal index makes it 
such that the field leads into a thickness from present to the past in a “[l]ateral kinship of 
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all the ‘nows.’”  (IP 7)  Likewise then, Flesh is “…immediate non-presence, but 
perspective understood as opening beyond, leading to it by its very thickness…” (IP 6)  
In this temporal sense, we have “access to another time on the basis of time” that is now. 
(IP xii)  Listen to Goethe’s, when on a trip to Rome he noted that: “...such conditions 
make it difficult from the outset for the observer to decipher how Rome follows on 
Rome, and not only the new on the old, but also the various epochs within the old and 
new Rome on one another.”30  Difficult, but not impossible, the Rückgestaltung of those 
imperceptible bearings differentiates the present in this richness between body and world 
made flesh, a visible foreground over-against a soliciting contingency of invisibility that 
informs us our possibility of movement: “Our time provides us with the resources of a 
communication with the past precisely when we do justice to its difference.” (IP xviii)  
  It is this fleshy element in its temporality then that the body and reflection never 
leave.  The reversibility of experience and reflection open passageways within fleshly 
grounded fields provided by the those very curvatures between bodily perceived world 
and traversed by following them out.  Our fields then are spatial, but also cultural; 
mythical, ideological, domains of knowledge by the invisible richness of the spatio-
temporal horizon which outlines them in a presented not-yet as an indirect return to a no-
longer.  In this way, the perceived between body and world is an “ensemble of my body’s 
routes and not a multitude of spatio-temporal individuals” whereby ensembles of bodies 
can come together in their unconscious intercorporeality to comprise the elemental 
fleshly thickets of fields and those compressed routes to be demonstrated as institutional 
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via our passing through one another. (VI 247)  Between co-anonymous bodies in their 
anteriority and soliciting world, flesh arises in their recesses, opens us “with the 
reversibility of the visible and the tangible” back onto our “intercorporeal being” as 
grounds for flesh; between myself and others through an unconscious reversibility within 
our bodily recesses, we share in, co-institute, and perpetuate the very flesh of which we 
are born. (VI 142)   
  This unconscious reversibility “always immanent and never realized in fact” (VI 
147) sustains “both mute perception and the speech” that finally turns back in co-
reversibility and “defines the flesh [that] exists in other fields.” (VI 147/155/144 Italics 
mine)  Thus, the flesh between certain bodies as a kind of double entendre of an 
unconscious “one same body” opens towards various fields of the world, sourced in the 
horizonal beyond as the vanishing point already presented in experience of the field itself.  
And it is at this vanishing limit where synergetic bodies co-institute their very flesh: “For 
they are not fictions with which I might populate my world…but my twins or the flesh of 
my flesh.  Certainly I do not live their lives…but that distance becomes a strange 
proximity as soon as one comes back to the perceptible world.” (Signs 15)  The flesh 
then, announces itself silently, acutely and undeniably as different people, from different 
places, are united by its ineluctable force.  Our encounters as arrangements of crises, 
traditions, and placements of material elements cuts through monadic cynicism.    
Following flesh’s very thickness of the spatial and temporal horizonal 
“beyond…still presented in experience” continually and institutionally confirms within 
each other that as flesh we are indeed both inside and outside ourselves rediscovered 
through each other and in that flesh we have left in the world.  It is because our spatio-
31 
 
temporal horizons are given within the differentiation of the field they open, where others 
in their anonymity and as my twins of flesh are equally both inside and outside of 
thesmelves.  Hence, “man can create the alter ego which ‘thought’ cannot create because 
he is outside of himself in the world and because on ek-stasis is compossible with other 
ek-stasis.” (Signs 170)  And finally, it is only by virtue of this chiasm of invisible 
recesses between us, between commensurable ek-stases stretching into the horizonal 
beyond as given, that as our temporal contingency allows us to understand one another, 
we understand Hölderlin’s assessment when he reminds that men “dwell near to one 
another on mountains farthest apart.”31  Flesh in its recesses as that which contingent for 
opened fields thus makes perception of things and each other, that which we need now 
explore, “man’s transitivity before the totality of what is, his displacement.”32   
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1:3 Perception, Institutional Sequel, and an Abandoned Analogy for Birth  
I count the day when I entered Rome as my second natal day, a true 
rebirth...This rebirth, which is remolding me from within. 
-Goethe, Italian Journey
33
   
 
Between the reversible synergetic body and the world, we located an opened field 
whereby the world could transcend and solicit us; a chiasm wherein an upsurge of flesh 
as the sensible exemplar outlined the horizon and grounds for possible mobility.  It was a 
commensurate chiasm of invisible recesses and commensurable ek-stases between us as 
our temporal contingencies that allowed us to understand one another; to “dwell near to 
one another on mountains farthest apart” when anonymous synergetic bodies co-generate 
flesh through co-reversals upon one another in intercorporeality - the “Ineinander of the 
other in us and of us in them.” 34   We had suggested that perception arises out of 
figurations of sedimented flesh as “man’s transitivity before the totality of what is” and 
equally “his displacement.”35 It is by outlining this “transitivity” and “displacement” that 
we come to understand perception anew as the differentiated outcome upon spatio-
temporal invisibility and towards a definition of institution.   
Specifically, institutional events or sequels will be shown to be those “events in 
an experience which endow the experience with a durable dimension”, that show the time 
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that is to be “constitutive of a time that is properly temporal” by presenting “the index of 
an interiority of time” and indicating sequel insofar this “overdetermination” as a 
“relation of relations” already indicates having gone further. (IP x/VI 240)  It will be this 
institutional moment in its “ominal sense” where events cannot be separated from one 
another, where older events appear and show themselves to be generators of the ones that 
followed, and the ones that followed showed themselves to bear the trace of those that 
came before.  It will be these events that will direct us towards to our reconceptualization 
of genuine birth.   
It was from the flesh as a spatio-temporal recess that we located a source for such 
“transitivity” and “differentiation”, insofar as committed to its recessional character it 
remains in “absence.”  For flesh “…is not a concept; it is barely even a word or notion.”36 
Rather, in its absence, we find a “non-figurative inner framework” that opens soliciting 
transcendence as “always further on” like Cézanne’s swelling outlines or the curvature of 
a world. (SMIM 114)  Opening and outcome of both spatial and temporal fields, flesh is 
thus a “plexus of sedimented meanings and the basis for the emergence of new 
meanings.” (SMIM 114)  These meanings are those accumulated and to be recast.  But 
this does not mean that the past remains truly behind me as I move through it as some 
predetermination: “The past not a ‘real’ fragment to be added to the present – 
Nacheinander der Jetztpunkte…[rather] implied therefore in the general powers of 
consciousness as the place of non-being.  There must be a presence of the past which is 
absence…” (IP 193)   
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Thus, this “non-figurative inner framework” or “plexus of sedimented meanings” 
is an invisible “constellation wherein our future is read....” pushed up into the time that is 
now. (VI 180)  The present punctuation of “red is what it is only by connecting up from 
its place with other reds about it, with which it forms a constellation...”37  It is by virtue 
of a compression within its unconscious connections then, that such constellations 
operate in the manner of “symbolic” or “existential matrices.” As such the time that is in 
its very temporal differentiation is a coordinated constellation run through like a matrix, 
such that the perceptual output reconfigures the constellation itself.  Thusly invited, we 
preemptively note “[t]ime is the very model of institution…but it is on time, the time that 
it is.” (IP 7)   
As the “armature of that ‘invisible world’ which, with speech, begins to 
impregnate all the things we see...” the “symbolic” or “existential matrices provide us 
with our first and tentative definition of institution: “Institution in the strong sense…this 
symbolic matrix that results in the openness of a field, of a future according to certain 
dimensions, and from this result we have the possibility of a common adventure and of a 
history as consciousness.” (VI 80/IP13)  Running the world through its recess anew, 
perception occurs through this constellatory transitivity and differentiated outcome as the 
present’s displacement.  
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Reformulated then, perception is that which becomes differentiated upon these 
invisible symbolic matrices harbored within the overall absence of flesh, that sensible 
exemplar which we open in our very moving through.  Perception in this movement 
comes to be to be exhibited along the invisible in dimensions, levels, in “the pilings of the 
world; we discover the world in degrees, in distance, in depth, and in difference.” (VI Iv)  
Differentiated along the invisible in mobility, perception is “an elemental event by which 
the flesh captures the lines of force of the world, brings itself up to the levels about which 
visibility is modulated and rises upright before vertical being.” (VI Iv)  Arising out of 
unconscious flesh it is an “elemental alliance with the invisible light.” (VI Iv)   
Specifically, the perceptible is a “crystallization” insofar as symbolic matrices run 
and reconfigure their course whereby the given is diffracted into multiple places of 
unconscious reflection, like multiple eyes shining back from a diamond. (VI 132)  Like 
Cézanne’s apples, “[t]he unity of the thing...is that of a certain style, a certain manner of 
managing the domain of space and time over which it has competency, of pronouncing, 
of articulating that domain, of radiating about a wholly virtual center.” (VI 115)  Hence, 
Cézanne’s objects subtly illuminated from within, and whose swells lead us on indirectly 
to a source never fully elucidated but open a traversable course never finalized: “Its light 
is never entirely in the present.” (IP 52)    It is for this reason, being based on an invisible 
recess into which the given is already soliciting, that Merleau-Ponty reformulated 
perception “not first of things but perception of elements…of rays of the world, things 
which are dimensions, which are worlds…” (VI 210 Italics mine)  
The present then, we tentatively say, is partially lit, is involved in shadows, is a 
chiaroscuro wherein its visibility leads beyond into its shadowy contingent invisibility.  
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Running through the internal temporal logic of its compressed constellation made 
existential matrix, we are invited and able to follow the curvature of this light into an 
internal logic, an area possible to move through, but not to see through.   On our way we 
enter fields and perceptions comprised of inner and outer horizons made topographical by 
“unfolding differentiation, by segregation,” which hold together through “the reflections, 
shadows, levels, and horizons between things.” (Signs 160)  Appearing from these 
shadows, birth, like perception, will be not first of a thing but of the possibility of an 
appearing world that solicits us to go further.   
*  *  *  *  *  * 
“The arms of consciousness reach out and grope, and the longer they are the 
better”, Nabokov once said.  “Tentacles, not wings are Apollo’s natural members.”38  
Having shown that consciousness is only differentiated on an unconscious, the visible on 
the invisible, it is the latter which we saw as the source of the lending swells, crescendos, 
reliefs, and obstacles at play in our grope and involved in a logos or structured temporally 
outlined in recession.   
Indeed, in its invisible reach, flesh was demonstrated to be a “cohesion without 
concept” wherein time opens before our eyes in its vibration, “echoes in the totality of the 
world” and hence bears the possibility of harmonizing and inverting of their parts. Of this 
involuntary dynamic possibility located within its symbolic matrices, Walton reminds us 
that “...ruptures in equilibrium, or reorganizations conform to an internal logic of which 
                                                 
38
 Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited. (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 1998), 173. 
37 
 
no clear view can be attained, because the course of events depends on the joint action of 
fragmentary phenomena.” (SMIM 114) Hence, institution in the strong sense is a 
“symbolic matrix that results in the openness of a field, of a future according to certain 
dimensions…” (VI 80/IP 13)  And it is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty tells us that 
institution makes no sense for consciousness: “To constitute in this sense is nearly the 
opposite of to institute: the instituted makes sense without me, the constituted makes 
sense only for me…” (IP 8)   
That these “tentacles” as kinds of temporal logos can of their own accord become 
inter-tangled, wrap upon themselves in witnessed “overdetermination,” is what Merleau-
Ponty calls a “relation of relations, a coincidence that cannot be fortuitous, that has an 
ominal sense.” (VI 240)  And it is this ominal sense, clearly conveyed by Goethe in the 
quote above.  This is the point, the Stiftung wherein flesh can bear witness to itself and an 
institutional event or sequel exposes the times of which its time is composed:  
...is being at a distance, it is the double ground of my life of consciousness, 
and it is what makes there be able to be Stiftung not only of an instant but of a 
whole system of temporal indexes – time (already as time of the body, 
taximeter, which are openness upon being. (VI 173) 
In this witnessed over-determination we must seek a different temporal 
compression.  We must turn to an instant wherein the combination of those “rays” are 
charged, wherein a Rückgestaltung is effected “through which the truth of this ray of 
Being or emergent Gestalt can be referred back to its origins in the previous and still not 
structured elements that bring about an invocation and search for an answer.” (SMIM 
122)  Hence, our second definition of institution: “[w]hat defines human institution? A 
past which creates a question, puts it in reserve, makes a situation that is indefinitely 
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open,” a truth that “lies in restructuring which, from one end to the other, is known to 
itself, and is in agreement with itself,” and does so by “[a] sort of existential eternity by 
means of self-interpretation.” (IP 22/49) 
Consequently, the pause to think, opening its own fields and domains from flesh, 
from its very own horizonal vanishing points, draws upon the “unthought-of” element (to 
borrow a term from Heidegger) of the field’s beyond. (Signs 160)  Thus, reflection does 
not put itself against the unreflected as what it would conceive of as a forever concealed 
non-being.  Rather, reflection is importantly put over-against reflection (prior and 
immediate) in a compression of invisibilities by which it is differentiated.  Thus, “to think 
is not to posses the objects of thought; it is to use them to mark out a realm, to think 
about that which we therefore are not thinking about.” (Signs 160)  
  Providing that elementary “unthought-of” through given flesh, reflection scans 
and taps, opening that “other dimension” hinted at by Husserl. (Signs 162)   For, from 
Ideen II it is clear that “reflection does not install us in a closed, transparent milieu, and 
that it does not take us…from ‘objective’ to ‘subjective,’ but that its function is rather to 
unveil a third dimension in which this distinction becomes problematic.” (Signs 162)  It 
is this stand where one makes pause to think on the peculiar reconfiguration of the 
opened perceptual field that allows for an over-determination and a compression between 
them and their invisibilities.        
That flesh opens in reflection and yet that reflection never escapes flesh means our 
best analogy for this instance where thought glimpses, penetrates, and fissures within 
flesh’s very own constellatory times is a “rogue wave” wherein the velocity of different 
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wakes (our reflection over against the reversibility of the body and reflection itself) 
combine to point a newly and significantly elevated crest towards a direction by which to 
follow: “Human institution:  [it is] chained integration, a whirlwind where everything 
converges, where everything succeeds; the Deckung (recouverement or coincidence) of 
an anticipation and of a regression and the founding of a true now that is full.” (IP 22)   
It is this institutional event, not a merely a continued instituting, but as the very 
repetition in re-operating asymmetrical sequel whereby the institution “reorganize itself 
according to a new sense that is nevertheless the same sense of this same structure.” (IP 
x)  It opens up and “continues while going beyond, conserves while destroying, interprets 
by deforming, and infuses a new sense into what nevertheless was called for and 
anticipated by this sense.” (Signs 34)  It is equally whereby one can bear witness to the 
times within a time, wherein the oldest is indentified because it has shown itself to be the 
generator of the latter and the more recent is identified because it is recognized as an 
innovation in reference to the former.  It is for this reason Merleau-Ponty tells us: “Time 
is the very model of institution: passivity-activity, it continues, because it has be 
instituted, it fuses, it cannot stop being, it is total because it is partial, it is a field.” (IP 7)  
It is the decentering which allows a re-institution through its fissure and a slight glimpse 
at flesh itself:   
The Stiftung of a point in time can be transmitted to the others without 
“continuity” without “conservation,” without fictitious “support” in the 
psyche the moment that one understands time as a chiasm.  Then past and 
present are Ineinander, each enveloping-enveloped – and that itself is the 
flesh.” (VI 267) 
  Having revealed its institutional momentary predecessors, peculiar to this 
experience is the sensation of participating in a project, one’s insofar as it is they who 
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have acted into it, but whereby the project supersedes their very awareness in the 
convention of the everyday.  It bears with it the sensation that one lives outside of 
themselves, and only through this opened temporal fissure has one reencountered and 
reestablished an equilibrium within their own temporality: “Theologians at least since 
Heraclitus have recognized this....the experience of mystical union being at the same time 
and experience of feeling apart: feeling oneself apart and feeling oneself a part.”39   
It is because of a “[l]ateral kinship of all the ‘nows’” that make the present which 
equally make it susceptible to decentering.  Not enclosed in our own time: “Our time 
provides us with the resource of a communication with the past precisely when we do 
justice to its difference.” (IP xviii)  Hence, “events present the index of an interiority of 
time”, that they “show themselves to be constitutive of a time, that is properly temporal.”  
Thus, we arrive at our most concise and useful definition of institution:          
Therefore by institution, we were intending here those events in an 
experience which endow the experience with durable dimensions, in relation 
to which a whole series of other experiences will make sense, will form a 
thinkable sequel or history – or again events which deposit a sense in me, not 
just as something surviving as a residue, but as the call to follow, the demand 
of a future. (IP ix) 
Institutional events are indeed these very sequels, “events in an experience which 
endow the experience with a durable dimension”, that show the time that is to be 
“constitutive of a time that is properly temporal” presenting “the index of an interiority of 
time.” (IP x)  We can recall Goethe from earlier when he lamented Rome’s laterally laden 
epochs and a difficulty “...to decipher how Rome follows on Rome, and not only the new 
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on the old, but also the various epochs within the old and new Rome on one another.”40  
But indeed, speaking of this multi-layered Rome as a kind of cultural origin he continued: 
“From this vantage point, history especially is read differently...In other places one reads 
from the outside in; here we imagine we are reading from the inside-out – everything lies 
spread around us and also extends out from us.”41 It is these two reflections taken in 
tandem, that allow us formulation a second natal description taken from the workings of 
institution: “...and I count the day when I entered Rome as my second natal day, a true 
rebirth...This rebirth, which is remolding me from within.”42  The sequel as “second natal 
day” is a re-institution and the beginning or birth of a re-cycling.   
Thus, we replace our initial and abandoned natal analogy of “the infant at its first 
breath” as provided by the tacit cogito with a different sort of experience.  Rather than a 
spontaneous and unexplainable irruption, the entrance of someone who was nothing, to a 
newly delivered significance as consciousness’ confirmation of the world over-against 
which its entrance stands, we will have to come to understand birth in the very fissure 
and subsequent exposure of a fullness of time that its very event indicates.  In other 
words, we will have to put birth on the side of life and not from the side of a non-being or 
death which life merely interrupts.    
With institutional events and sequels and circumscribed, we are now able to move 
to Arendt’s reflections on natality in its links with action to supplement this new and 
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under formulated notion of birth.  We can now segue from Merleau-Ponty in this 
discussion on reconfiguring constellations of significance towards Arendt’s exploration 
of action in its natal links by quoting from Arendt herself: “…the smallest act in the most 
limited circumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and 
sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation.” (HC 190) 
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Chapter Two: Hannah Arendt 
2.1 Action, its Preconditions, and its Relationship to Natality and Nature 
 Throughout our first chapter, we provided a chronological account of Merleau-
Ponty’s thought, tracing a natal thread through the tacit cogito towards flesh and 
institution.  It was the latter of these which failed to carry forward the natal analogy of the 
former, that “infant at its first breath” abandoned with no subsequent formulation for 
birth. (PhP 470)  We were left to supplement Merleau-Ponty’s shift in thought with 
concordant musings from Goethe, who having entered Rome found history read 
differently.  Entering this temporally compressed origin, the time that was fissured, 
spreading its epochs before him such that Goethe found himself born anew.  Now, in our 
second chapter, we will have the opportunity to chronologically trace the thoughts of 
Hannah Arendt and in doing so, provide ourselves with her direct reflection on natality 
by which to subsequently merge our two thinkers towards a genuine account of birth in 
the final chapter with a recuperation of this abandoned natal thread. 
 In this chapter, we continue with an explication of Hannah Arendt’s major 
concept of action, outlining its necessary preconditions that distinguish it from 
conventional acts.  These reflections will prove invaluable insofar as action’s outlined 
preconditions remind us that of all human activities “action has the closest connection 
with the human condition of natality.” (HC 9)  Further, these reflections allow us to 
establish the inter esse as the well-spring of dynamic possibility between men.  The inter 
esse is precisely that location where aimed action delays an otherwise mortal trajectory 
by intersecting with nature’s eternal cycle in the advent of the new; a instance of revealed 
physis as the totality of man’s conditioning to be later expanded within the cyclical noēsis 
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noēseōs of the thinking ego.  It is the latter’s deep temporal structure which makes its 
metaphorical re-turn a tangent whereby nature itself, as what is between men, 
reconfigured in this natal appearance.   
It is difficult to read the works of Hannah Arendt without acknowledging the 
espoused hope of possibility that individual birth brings into the world.  It has been 
suggested that this “natal turn” is in direct response to Arendt’s former mentor 
Heidegger.
43
  As mentioned earlier, parts of Heidegger’s thought were problematic for 
Arendt, clinging as they were to the final lifelines of a metaphysical tradition.  
Heidegger’s Blitz and “ringing sound of silence” were commensurate with his 
reinterpretation of Husserl’s early intentionality; away from static Husserlian 
epistemology in favor of presence with an emphasized aim towards the future and 
ultimately outlining Dasein’s nature as a being-towards-death. (LM 122)  Operating as 
the dominate half of liminal concepts birth and death, Heidegger’s “death” frames a kind 
determinateness to and grounds the lived present by inclusion of the ultimate end.  Thus, 
the aim remains metaphysical insofar as mortality, casting a shadow of finitude over a 
lived life from afore, and death, pursued and experienced by an isolated individual in 
their expiring moments, “provides the limit that allows a grasp of the whole.”44  
In the section, The Traditional Substitution of Making for Acting, Arendt sees 
Plato as introducing the metaphysical tradition in this originally enframing spirit.  It was 
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Plato’s epistemology of reminiscence (anamnesis) that took the key concept of “idea, 
from experiences in the realm of fabrication…first, perceiving the image or shape (eidos) 
of the product-to-be, and then organizing the means and starting the execution.” (HC 
225)  Indeed, Arendt’s choice word of execution is fitting insofar as the enframed ends 
given in advance truncate the spontaneity of an acting plurality: “Certainly, Plato had 
already made philosophy what it is by turning from the city and from life to gaze at death, 
finally construing the philosophical life as the life spent practicing death.” 45  
Consequently, our access to knowledge was reminiscence or re-understanding of an 
already outlined Form “that allows a grasp of the whole.”46  By privileging perceived 
abstract ends-in-advance (likely with the execution of his mentor in mind), Plato’s 
philosophy sought to control the unpredictability, irreversibility, and anonymity inherent 
to an active plurality throughout time: “In contradistinction to fabrication, where the light 
by which to judge the finished product is provided by the image or model perceived 
beforehand...the light that illuminates processes of action, and therefore all historical 
processes appears only at their end...” (HC 192)   
To be sure, Plato’s emphasis of fabrication does not do away in its entirety the 
possibility of beginnings – “Labor and work, as well as action, are all rooted in 
natality…” (HC 9)  But “[t]he problem, as Plato saw it, was to make sure that the 
beginner would remain the complete master of what he had begun, not needing the help 
of others to carry it through.” (HC 222)  Likewise, Heidegger’s metaphysical construal of 
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a being-toward-death, despite [Mitsein and] futural openness, leads to a progressively 
isolated individual along a trajectory that ends as solely his own.  It is the trajectory of 
one’s own life as one’s own final project.  And finally this trajectory “…is a thought of 
endings, and thereby, a thought of passivity rather than of activity with sense of 
beginnings.”47   
Concerning this passive unfolding, Arendt asserts, “If left to themselves human 
affairs can only follow the law of mortality, which is the most certain and the only 
reliable law of a life spent between birth and death.” (HC 246)  The only alternative to 
this doomed trajectory is an interruption by action.  Like the specificity of Merleau-
Ponty’s institutional events, it would be a mistake to qualify every performance as action 
in the Arendtian sense.  Specifically, qualified action as the highest possible human 
activity was outlined by Aristotle’s energeia: “activities that do not pursue an end (are 
ateleis) and leave no work behind (no par’ autas erga) but exhaust their full meaning in 
the performance itself.” (HC 206)  It is in an instance of a full actuality (energeia), where 
“the end (telos) is not pursued but lies in the activity itself which therefore becomes an 
entelecheia (full reality).” (HC 206)     
Thus, qualified action stands in itself and supplements itself with no external 
ends, beaming forth in its fullness from a background of conventional acts in meaningful 
presence.
48
  It is a kind of “event eudaimonia” having the “connotation of 
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blessedness...[in] a lasting state of being which is neither subject to change nor capable of 
effecting change.” (HC 193)  Achilles bought his immortality and eudaimonia only at the 
price of summing up his life in a single deed.  Likewise, a qualified act “comes to its end 
together with life itself”, not in an apocalyptic or deathly sense but by virtue of their 
convergence; life’s total exemplification in compounded fullness opened anew through 
deed. (HC 194)  This is why the two aforementioned Aristotelian concepts are 
interrelated: “...full actuality (energeia) effects and produces nothing besides itself, and 
full reality (entelecheia) has no other end besides itself. (HC 206)  And it is at their 
convergence that Arendtian action in its fullness mirrors in over-determination the full 
light of that entelecheia to which it responds and subsequently breaching a threshold to 
cast it anew. 
It follows that in comparison to Heidegger’s enframement by mortal end, action 
qualified as this intersection between energeia and entelecheia “has the closest 
connection with the human condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in 
birth…felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning 
something anew, that is, of acting.” (HC 9)  And insofar as energeia “lies in the activity 
itself which therefore becomes an entelecheia” energeia is in its natal connection the 
making or birth of being. (HC 206)  It is the birth of being from the inner workings of 
being, pursuing no end exterior to itself and leaving no work behind, that “comes to its 
ends together with life itself” as life’s total exemplification, beaming forth in meaningful 
presence with the emergence of the new. (HC 194) 
This illuminating quality of qualified action was “kalon, the sheer beauty of 
appearances.” (LM 130)  And human virtue, the kalon k’agathon, was assessed “only by 
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the performance, by how he [the actor] appeared while he was doing.” (LM 131)  With 
this desire for making a meaningful appearance, a Homeric actor like Achilles would 
strive for “the only incentive worth of man qua man…the striving for immortality,” 
exemplifying life in its total fullness whereby the appearing actor, breaching an immortal 
threshold, entered the ranks of the gods. (LM 134)   
In this way, the actor was the correlative inverse of “gods who appeared to 
men…in a familiar human disguise and…recognized as divinities only by those whom 
they approached.” (LM 142)  He was a man who appeared in familiar divine disguise and 
was admitted among the latter’s ranks.  Both producing kalon, their action brought to 
light “a harmonious order behind them which itself is not visible and of which 
nevertheless the world of appearances gives us a glimpse.” (LM 143)  For “[m]en and 
gods were like each other, both of one kind…drawing breath from one mother; the Greek 
gods, as Herodotus tells us, has he same physis as men.” (LM 130)  Indeed, “[a]nother 
early word for the invisible in the midst of the appearances is physis, nature, which 
according to the Greeks was the totality of all things…that had come into being by 
themselves,” and which sent awe struck men into “admiring wonder.” (LM 143)  Physis 
then, nature as the appearing totality of all things, is that spectacle opened or cleaving 
between action and action, the precarious birth of being insofar as it that by which to 
follow and further act through; the emergence of the new opened in action yet always by 
being kept at a distance in its outstanding quality.  
This illuminating spectacle traced out in the very movement of an act allowed for 
its witnesses to break out in praise, a retelling of events which immortalized our hero in 
the form of a story.  Within this example of a hero having opened immortality with acts 
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reflecting in over-determination the entelecheia to which they respond (generating the 
sheer beauty of appearance) we can locate the two preconditions for action as the birth of 
being.       
The first precondition of action is that the birth of being is also a disclosure and 
subsequent birth of the actor in his “who.” Specifically, it is that our “second birth”, an 
act by which with “word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world”, can answer 
with story the question borne with every ‘newcomer’: “Who are you?”49  Precarious by 
nature, this “who” of progressive and multiple insertions cannot be considered an 
unequivocal or coincidental identity offered in self-reflection.  Always finding itself 
bound to plurality and the relationships from which it springs, this “who” is always a “to-
whom” – a persona without person arising in interaction like the ancient Greek daimon 
that accompanies each man throughout his life, “always looking over his shoulder from 
behind and thus only visible to those he encounters.”50 (HC 180)  Sourced in the living 
flux of one’s acting and speaking, this “who” at best comes to pass in the “same manner 
as the notoriously unreliable manifestations of ancient oracles” neither revealing nor 
hiding in words, but given as “manifest signs.” (HC 182)   
                                                 
49
 Indeed, in comparison to the above outlining of action in its positivity, action can equally be outlined by what it is 
not.  If action is inaugural, non-action would be an act that fails to disclose a “who.”  We had said in our previous 
footnote that a cliché darkens the public space.  Now we may quote the passage in full: “The use of clichés discloses 
nothing or no one; it is a cliché precisely because it says nothing.  Indeed, it is worse – saying nothing, the cliché 
darkens the public space by making it more difficult, if not impossible, for the unexpected word to appear.”  Arendt 
here agrees with Heidegger on at least this point: “...clichés are the speech of das Man, the Anyone, whose speech 
covers over the uniqueness of the ‘who.’” Ibid. 194. 
50
 “The self is not a consequence of speech: the ‘who’ is born in the very speaking itself….[S]he [Arendt] refers to the 
Greek notion of the self as persona, the voice that speaks through the mask in ancient tragedy.  For Arendt, the 
important point is that there is no one behind the mask – the self is the person, the voice that shines through.” Ibid. 192. 
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Our everyday actions generally leave open their unfinished meaning and that of 
our public identity, whereas only actions like that of Achilles (“summing up all of one’s 
life in a single deed’) can grant an immortal “product.”  But such greatness is not entirely 
necessary.  For as our “who” conventionally stands, if truly coincidental in nature and not 
a ‘to-whom’, “we would never be able to keep our identities” condemned to “wander 
helplessly and without direction in the darkness of each man’s lonely heart, caught in its 
contradictions and equivocalities.” (HC 244)  Hence, the “who” is dependent on plurality, 
wherein action and subsequent disclosure result in “...the light shed over the public realm 
through the presence of others,” giving confirmation to our very existence. (HC 244)  Our 
identity in its continual deferral away from oneself is a kind of identity in negation and is 
that which situates and informs us of who we are amongst a people in its mirrored return 
through others.  Thus, that we already tell stories about one another is enough to grant us 
a certain freedom in our own person, like all other freedoms, bound in the very 
contingencies of others. 
It is in this plurality where our first precondition can be satisfied that we locate 
the second precondition for action as the birth of being. Assuming that the capacity for 
disclosure in the public realm has not been overshadowed by a regime of fabrication 
(means-to-ends dominance), future-perfect agendas (ends justifying all means), or a loss 
of “sheer human togetherness,” the resulting stories as answer to our natal question 
(“who?”) are sourced from and aimed back at an in-between individuals that becomes sui 
generis.  This self-generating vague framework is called the “web of human 
relationships”, composed of those words and deeds that are aimed at and remain active 
in-between men, what Arendt calls the inter esse.  Despite lacking the tangibility and 
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durability of a world borne of fabrication, the inter esse is “no less real” and no less 
operant in the workings of the world, but is far less certain than the shared objective 
spaces in which we move. (HC 183)  Whereas our first precondition for action, then, was 
the necessary disclosure of a “who”, the second precondition is that an action be aimed at 
this inter esse – that is, never in isolation and always aimed into a web of plurality in its 
very vibration.    
It is this web then that is entangled in an infinite and echoing “process character” 
out of which the new can emerge. (HC 230)  This process character is all important to 
“the unprecedented concept and consciousness of history,” a process started “whose 
outcome is unpredictable, so that uncertainty rather than frailty becomes the decisive 
character of human affairs.” (HC 232)  The historicity of this process character in its 
formative relation to the web of human relationships determines the “[l]imitations and 
boundaries” with a given realm of human affairs, that thus delineate the qualifications for 
action opened between actor and spectators and subsequently, like a pregnancy coming to 
term, the criteria for the new.   
And yet, these boundaries “…never offer a framework that can reliably withstand 
the onslaught with which each new generation must insert itself.” (HC 190)  It is in this 
sense that the full actuality (energeia) and subsequent full reality (entelecheia) of an 
action in its contribution to an epoch is itself susceptible to be taken up anew by those 
“newcomers” who task it will be to take up in their own natal acts those heroic examples 
to circumvent a trajectory of deterioration.  Having an “inherent tendency to force open 
all limitations and cut across all boundaries” action in its very process character means 
that “[t]he process of a single deed can quite literally endure throughout time until 
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mankind itself has come to an end” whereby mankind’s very end would signal the end of 
initiated action itself. (HC 233)  
It follows that in contradistinction to the reliable and passively accepted “law of 
mortality”, action involves “unreliable laws” - an unfinished and precarious “who,” and 
boundless consequences bearing inherent unpredictability within plurality to which it is 
aimed. Already aimed at human affairs “with its innumerable, conflicting wills and 
intentions…action almost never achieves its purpose, but it is also because of this 
medium...[by] which action alone is real.” (HC 184)  For better or worse, we are bound 
by a contingency of others that determines what actions are possible and what are actions 
in the qualified sense.  Away from the isolation into which we depart and aimed into the 
affairs of a plurality into which we insert ourselves in “second birth”, action is the 
affirmation and expression of bounded potentiality of that which exists in the inter esse of 
men.  As such, and as our only alternative to a passive trajectory doomed to deterioration, 
action as rooted in natality is the “...miracle that saves the world, the realm of human 
affairs, from its normal, ‘natural’ ruin...” (HC 247)  In this sense, human affairs left to 
themselves is in actuality only another way of formulating multiple solitary and parallel 
paths each driven towards their own solitary mortality writ large.  It is here then, that we 
can quote Arendt in length:  
The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything 
human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it 
and beginning something a new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an 
ever present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to 
die but in order to begin.  Yet just as, from the standpoint of nature, the 
rectilinear movement of man’s life-span between birth and death looks like a 
peculiar deviation from the common natural rule of cyclical movement, thus 
action seen from the view point of the automatic processes which seem to 
determine the course of the world, looks like a miracle. (HC 246) 
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Not born to die, or a being-towards-death, we are born in order to begin.  This 
beginning through action is a departure from a solitary rectilinear trajectory on the way to 
ruin.  It is a departure from the enframing liminal concepts of “dust to dust,” between a 
presupposed non-being from which we enter and to which we return in death: “that we 
are in possession of these limiting boundary concepts enclosing out thought within 
insurmountable walls – and the notion of an absolute beginning and absolute end is 
among them – does not tell us more than that we are indeed finite beings.” (LM 200)  
This fact is all too obvious.  Rather, “[i]f action as beginning corresponds to the fact of 
birth, if it is the actualization of the human condition of natality,” than our insertion as the 
birth of being takes its source “from the beginning which came into the world when we 
were born and to which we respond by beginning something new on our own initiative.” 
(HC 177)  Thus, away from death in its non-being as a deviation from nature’s eternal 
return, our liminal boundaries through action must be shown to be birth as re-birth and 
generation linked within nature’s cyclical return itself.   
We have said the man in action makes a kind of divine spectacle in the world and 
in doing so appears himself in the light of the divine.  This illuminating quality of 
qualified action was “kalon, the sheer beauty of appearances” which resonated 
throughout the entelecheia which it recast in an appearance simultaneous with the new. 
(LM 130)  And it is here, in our above mention of nature’s eternal cycle that we may 
return to equate the aforementioned kalon between man and gods, who “both of one 
kind” sharing the same physis, also share in a relationship to the threshold of the 
immortal. (LM 130)  Like his descending divine brethren “who appeared in familiar 
human disguise and were recognized as divinities only by those whom they approached” 
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an acting man appeared in familiar divine disguise performing godly actions making 
physis, that harmonious order of the invisible in the midst of the visible (“the totality of 
all things…that had come into being by themselves”) appear.  Making heaven appear on 
earth, his mortal brothers could wonder at this spectacle and break out in praise: “…what 
set men wondering is something familiar and yet normally visible…of the harmonious 
order behind them which itself is not visible and of which nevertheless the world of 
appearances gives us a glimpse.” (LM 143)  Both men in ascending action and 
descending gods have the ability to cause kalon, which is the opening of physis (nature).     
Thus, action’s natal beginnings as the birth of being, as an initiated upsurge of the 
dynamic inter esse at which it is aimed, shares in and is our “acting in” point of 
intersection with the automatic cyclical return of nature – a spectacular “miracle” of the 
totality of all things and the harmonious order between them on the background of our 
mortal trajectory.    
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2.2 Inter Esse and Action Continued in Confirmation of Our Being Conditioned 
We have seen that it was action’s links to natality as the birth of being that 
otherwise thwarted a mortal trajectory, intersecting with nature’s eternal cyclical return in 
a spectacular upsurge of the inter esse; the spectacular and shining appearance of the 
totality of all things, the invisible in the midst of the visible (physis) at the emergence of 
the new as the miracle that saves man.  Bearing this in mind, we continue to explore the 
conditioned nature of that very inter esse where all action is aimed and by which all 
appearances of the new derive. 
Against mortality, all too well known to the ancient Greeks, a confidence in the 
immortalizing quality of action allowed those famous words - “Wherever you go, you 
will be a polis” - to be a mantra of Greek expansion. (HC 198)  This mantra “expressed 
the conviction that acting and speech create a space between the participants which can 
find its proper location almost anytime and anywhere.  It is the space of appearance in the 
widest sense...the space where I appear to others as others appear to me...” (HC 198)  In 
order to properly understand this faith in a space of appearance it is important to 
remember that beyond its fortified walls, the polis was primarily intended as a form of 
organized remembrance.  Having taken its impetus from “the Greek pre-polis experience 
and estimate of what makes it worthwhile for men to live together (syzēn)”, namely, the 
“sharing of words and deeds”, the polis was meant to ensure that those fleeting human 
activities (action and speech) and their equally otherwise ephemeral outcomes as stories 
and the disclosed “who” found at their centers could secure a kind of godly immortality: 
“[t]he polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the 
organization of the people as it arises out of the acting and speaking together, and its true 
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space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen 
to be.” (HC 197)  At any place and at any time, acting amongst one another, speaking to 
each other and of each other’s stories, Homeric Greeks could preserve the space of 
appearance, evoke that which lies between them, and multiply the chances to make 
“ordinary the extraordinary” in an immortal aim. (HC 197) 
 That action understood as such was considered the highest achievement, Pericles 
himself envisioned a city-state founded solely on the boundlessness and ever-echoing 
nature of action to keep intact an opened remembrance upon Greeks addressing one 
another.  It was the hope that “men can enact and save their greatness at the same time 
and, as it were, by one and the same gesture, and that the performance as such will be 
enough to generate dynamis and not need the transforming reification of [fabrication] to 
keep it in reality.” (HC 205) And yet despite this mantra as the “innermost convictions of 
the people of Athens” we acknowledge with Arendt that this confidence was an 
insufficient means to secure one’s god-like status. (HC 205)  In the end, the origin the 
polis, the pre-polis experience of the Trojan War from which the city-state sprang and 
found its ethos (a space meant to “multiply the occasions to win “immortal fame” and the 
chances to distinguish oneself amongst his peers), would have been lost without the verse 
and guiding light provided by a blind poet’s words, Homer’s words. 
Thus, our exploration of the inter esse in its being conditioned begins in this 
relationship between actor and witness, the latter of which can recall and convey the 
former’s heroic deeds.  We have said that man in action breaches a threshold, making a 
divine appearance in the world and that the resulting kalon shining and reflecting 
entelecheia in over-determination was linked to physis (nature), to the “invisible in the 
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midst of appearance…which according to the Greeks was the totality of all things.” (LM 
143)  Such appearances struck men with “admiring wonder…which breaks out in 
speech…in the form of praise.” (LM143)  In this initial movement from praxis to logos, 
the question is rightly asked, who wins immortal fame, the doer or the storyteller?   
The great actor Achilles, remained dependent upon the storyteller as the latter’s 
story was dependent on those who perform great actions.  Action is dependent on 
spectatorship – aimed at the inter esse as one of its preconditions - and spectatorship is 
defined only by being witness-to.  As we have already said, the actor as “hero” is 
revealed by the light his action sheds over the public realm.  But bound as a ‘to-whom’ or 
bearing his daimōn to which he is blind, he is subject to the unpredictability as to the 
reception of his initiative.  For this reason alone, one’s story as “the results of action and 
speech, reveal and agent, but this agent is not an author or producer.” (HC 184)  Prone to 
this blind spot he acts out of, that to be reflected back upon him, he is “subject in the 
twofold sense of the word, namely actor and sufferer.” (HC 184)  His actions ripple in the 
already established web of human relationships and these wakes find their way back to 
their subjected initiator.  Thus, his story, like the great story of history, has nobody for its 
author.    
As counterpart to an actor, the witness, in a process of reification, becomes a 
storyteller.  This idea of storyteller is found in Homer in the example of the blind bard.  
Odysseus, listening to the blind bard’s song of his trials and tribulations “covers his face 
and weeps, though he has never wept before, and certainly not when what he is now 
hearing actually happened.” (LM 132)  Only when Odysseus hears his tale sung does he 
become aware of the meaning of his own story.  An actor’s blindness to potential and 
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latent reciprocity of his act reflected in its latent significance and subsequent judgment 
we have established.  But in addition we note that our bard is himself blind: “[t]he bard 
sings for men and gods what the Muse, Mnemosyne, who watches over Remembrance, 
had put into his mind.  The Muse gave him good and bad: she deprived him of eyesight 
and gave him sweet song.” (LM 132)  Withdrawing from the world given to his senses, 
the blind bard circles back in memory to make what is absent, but nonetheless called for, 
present.  Memory takes its cues from the sensorial from which it withdraws and conceals 
in its focus on that returned.   
Storytelling then, in contrast to mere witnessing is a mental act that rests on the 
mind’s faculty of having present to itself what is absent from the senses: “Re-
presentation, making present what is actually absent, is the mind’s unique gift, and since 
our whole mental terminology is based on metaphors drawn from vision’s experience, 
this gift is called imagination...” (LM 76)  Like the actor then, the witness turned 
storyteller equally operates in and is subject to a sort of latency, the latency of mnemonic 
return and its recasting of the witnessed deed’s significance only in continued 
retrospectivity and re-interpretation.  To be sure, the return of meaning itself is not latent 
having occurred with memory itself.  Rather, coming out of an action’s infinite process, a 
historicity formative only in relation to the web’s inter esse, an action remembered can be 
recast.  Meaning then, is latent insofar as, like action in its endless process character, it is 
never finished and casts its significance anew in an appearance never definitely closed.     
Regardless of position, actor or storyteller, their blindness equates to the same 
thing.  That “[t]he meaning of what actually happens and appears while it is happening is 
revealed when it has disappeared; remembrance, by which you make present to your 
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mind what actually is absent and past, reveals the meaning in the form of a story.” (LM 
133)  The actor is latent to the meaning of his acts being dependent on plurality for its 
confirmed return.  Likewise, the storyteller “...who does the revealing is not involved in 
the appearances, he is blind shielded against the visible, in order to be able to ‘see’ the 
invisible.” (LM 133)  By withdrawing from the present world of appearances from where 
he takes his cue, “...he sees with blind eyes and puts into words…the story, not the deed 
itself and not the doer, although the doer’s fame will reach the high heavens.” (LM 133)  
Hence, the story in its solicited return always bears the possibility of taking on meaning 
anew.   
We note then, that both acting and storytelling are involved in their own unique 
and complimentary blindness.  The former’s disclosure through act or speech is 
inextricably tied to the living flux in which he appears, “it can be represented and 
‘reified’ only through a kind of repetition, the imitation of mimēsis, which according to 
Aristotle...is appropriate only to the drama, whose very name indicates that play-acting 
actually is an imitation of acting.” (HC 187)  Yet, concerning the storyteller in its 
evocation, “not only does this imitative element lie in repetition of a performance, but 
equally in the making or writing of the play.” (HC 187)  Hence, both actor and witness 
seem inclusive and mutually co-dependent for the aforementioned “event eudaimonia” 
(the intersection of energeia and entelecheia) as equated with man’s breaching of the 
immortal by opening physis in all its appearance.  That is to say, the spectacle appears 
only between them, their superimposed blindness’, and mutual latencies.  The spectacle 
of physis, whereby the usually invisible is made to appear in the midst of the visible, 
exists between men or is otherwise, at least temporarily, forgotten. 
60 
 
Both blinded into latency by the sheer kalon of an act, meaning cycles back to 
illuminate the present to those actions worthy of immortality and those stories worthy of 
praise.  It was Homer’s tales (that storied art form which throughout Greek was 
considered energeia, which “therefore becomes an entelecheia) as a kind of institution 
that was instituting in its reification through mimēsis; the former experience of the Trojan 
War from which the polis sprang and exemplifying a disposition by which to live, blind 
Homer’s words held in equilibrium and structured in an operating ethos that would have 
otherwise been lost. (HC 206)  Homer’s capacity to “turn words to praise” circulated in 
repetition functioning as a backdrop from which a performance “comes fully to life” and 
this alone allowed, for a time, the continual re-return and re-newal of the original 
obsession with immortality. (HC 197)   
Thus, between actor and witness turned storyteller, we expand our prior 
conclusions: unlike the “light” by which to judge a fabrication as perceived before hand, 
the “light that illuminates” upon and from within an action inserted into the human web, 
like the kalon of revealed physis, appears from its own infinite process character 
established prior, circulating, and cycling back to an implied encoding before falling on 
and unveiling that which “shines forth most.” (HC 225)  What shines forth most as the 
emergence of the new is already delineated in the inter esse, determining the criteria for a 
qualified action and the spectacle of physis between men.  And as between men, this light 
is the upsurge of the inter esse through action revealing that which was invisible or 
otherwise overshadowed as returned anew – physis.   
Hence we note that work (fabrication), and action are rooted in natality insofar as 
both are charged with the task of providing for and preserving the world, but it was 
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specifically the latter that connected to nature in its eternal cycle to circumvent what was 
otherwise a mortal trajectory.   Action’s “light from nowhere” like an “infinite 
improbability which occurs regularly...action has the closest connection with the human 
condition of natality.” (HC 178)  It appears from the aforementioned darkness within the 
human heart whereby the “new…always appears in the guise of a miracle.” (HC 178)  It 
is for this reason that the human condition or humans as being conditioned by what lies 
between them “comprehends more than the conditions under which life has been given to 
man”: 
In addition to the conditions under which life is given to man on earth...Men 
are conditioned being because everything they come in contact with turns 
immediately into a condition of their existence...Whatever touches or enters 
into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the 
character of a condition of human existence.  This is why men, no matter 
what they do, are always conditioned beings.  Whatever enters the human 
world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort becomes part of 
the human condition. (HC 9) 
 We had said that it was the from the view point of nature in its cyclical movement 
that our life spanning from birth to death seemed like a deviation from this common rule.  
Likewise, human affairs, passively accepted, found themselves on a trajectory of ruin.  
We had also said that action’s initiative is a departure from this rectilinear and doomed 
trajectory, that in its natal beginnings it was an initiated upsurge of the inter esse and 
equally our “acting in” point of intersection with the automatic cyclical returning of 
nature – the appearance of physis as “a miracle” on the background of our mortal 
trajectory commensurate with the birth of being.   
In action’s link to this common rule, as a sort of natal pact shared with the world 
we expand our thoughts by recognizing that intersecting action and nature unfold in 
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communion upon this “miracle” as the emergence of the new.  Action, as the birth of 
being, and the appearance of the totality of our nature (aligned with our inter esse), 
continually dive into each other in the spectacle that their intersecting creates, opening an 
“endless process character” of unfolding significance and mutual co-conditioning.  In 
other words, physis, the revealed harmonious order between invisibles in the midst of the 
visible, is that “point” of the conditioning our inter esse, that intersection with nature’s 
eternal cycle to be returned anew.   
As the point of intersection, cyclical nature and compressed action converge 
directly with (and take upsurge from) that which exists in-between persons; acting into 
our conditioned nature is equally a conditioning of our nature and our powers to act.  This 
is why, paraphrasing Ecclesiastes Arendt tells us: “Without action to bring into the play 
of the world the new beginning of which each man is capable by virtue of being born, 
“there is no new thing under the sun”; without speech to materialize and memorialize 
“new things” that appear and shine forth, “there is no remembrance.”” (HC 204) 
We conclude this section by reflecting on this “remembrance” insofar as there is 
one more valuable example of our being conditioned best given in the example of an 
action itself, whereby the conditioning and action are continually coincidental in their 
own entelecheia.  It is an action that best master’s the “two-fold darkness of human 
affairs” – that is of the “basic reliability of men who never can guarantee today who they 
will be tomorrow” and “the impossibility of remaining unique masters of what they do, of 
knowing its consequences and relying upon the future.” (HC 244)  It is a moral precept 
“not applied from the outside, from some supposedly higher faculty or from experiences 
outside of action’s own reach” and this action is the unique act of promise. (HC 246) 
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To be sure, promise finds its fulfillment or failure in its signaled return; the 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction of real events which reveal the promise that was.  It is only 
complete through its being in reserve, its withholding into a kind of latency that signals 
its end in reference to its having been made, and thus, has a claim upon return prior to 
performance or constraint at a future date.   As an act overarching and encompassing its 
duration, mutual promise offers us “certain islands of predictability” and “guideposts of 
reliability” in the unpredictable and irreversible sea of action. (HC 237)  Thus, promise, 
like all actions as aimed between men, grants men more freedom and allows man to go 
farther than he could in his isolation.  The moral precept of promise, within action’s own 
reach, is like a control mechanism “built into the very faculty to start new and unending 
processes,” only by virtue of the fact that promise, like all qualified actions, are made on 
the contingencies of and touch upon the inter esse of men. (HC 246)   
As an action, as the birth of being, promise is “the one miracle-working faculty of 
man…as Jesus of Nazareth…must have known very well” when putting such miracles 
within the reach of us earthly bound creatures. (HC 247)  Arendt’s mention of Jesus is 
not arbitrary.  As a symbol of our salvation from ruin, as an espoused faith and hope for a 
world founded on the promise inherent in natality (in what it can return to the world), it 
found “its most glorious and most succinct expression in the few words with which the 
Gospels announced their ‘glad tidings’: ‘A child has been born unto us.’” (HC 247)  If 
promise, like all other acts, is the birth of being, we can conclude that this birth is of the 
inter esse and bears with it the structure of a promise’s return as indicative our being 
conditioned by it.  Action bears the new, and insofar as promise is an action, promise in 
its departure and signaled return will provide us with a birth of the now. 
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2:3 Intersecting of the Inter Esse, Action, and the Life of the Mind 
Having shown ourselves as conditioned at a spectacular and appearing 
intersection, we will now expand our reflections on action and natality into a shift within 
thought.  I would like to expand on the already advanced claim that appearing is a kind of 
birthing, a making visible of something that was previously invisible as seen in the 
example of physis which in its spectacular opening allowed the new to emerge.  That is 
that originally invisible physis, a shared and harmonious cyclical nature between heaven 
and earth which appearing gods collaterally revealed in its totality through their 
descending arrival, or that an actor revealed in its totality through his ascending to 
immortality, came to be replaced with the thought of being, in the very spectacular return 
provided by the noēsis noēseōs. 
Thus far, we have focused on an ethos of the pre-philosophic Greeks to multiply 
the chances to achieve storied immortality through action.  It was by virtue of an action 
wherein a “hero” was disclosed within a web of human relations, wherein no ends were 
sought outside the performance which qualified this act as of the highest kind.  Indeed, 
“transparent in Homer’s poems…is that the innermost meaning of the acted deed and the 
spoken word is independent of victory and defeat”, that it remains untouched by outcome 
or consequence. (HC 205)  Rather, the emphasis was on criteria of appearance and the 
possibility of appearing in a god-like fashion.  
Further, we focused on the fact that one, in acting, could never be witness to the 
final outcome of his deed in an analogous structure to the disclosure of his “who.”  
Spectators were relied upon as witness to the spectacle and thus, not entirely excluded 
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from a divine appearance opened between men; as a necessity for storied athanatizein the 
spectator could share in the presence brought to bear.  Between God and witnessing man 
there was a shared desire and passion for seeing, to see the “kalon, the sheer beauty of 
appearances” such that human virtue, “the kalon k’agathon, was assessed neither as an 
innate quality or intention of the actor, nor by the consequences of his deeds – only by the 
performance, by how he appeared while he was doing...” (LM 130)  Indeed, “a partiality 
shared” between gods and their mortal counterparts was the desire to see such spectacles.  
For the former, this meant to try to affix a god’s eye view and look “down from Olympus 
upon the affairs of men...[participating in the] Olympian gods’ feeling for the world’s 
spectacular quality.” (HC 130)  
But despite this shared desire differences are clear, namely, the difference in 
abode, powers, and that divinities although having been born, “were deathless.” (LM 
130)  Further, the gods were always privileged with the power of appearance, creating 
spectacles every time they entered into the mortal world.  Mortal beholding of such 
spectacles (theasthai, whose very root comes from theatai or “spectators”) was reserved 
for those wonder-struck men for whom a god appeared,  “...appeared in familiar human 
disguise and were recognized as divinities only by those whom they approached.” (LM 
142)
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In this sense, the wonder of spectatorship is pathos, something suffered.  In 
Homer, “it is the god who acts, whose appearance men have to endure, from whom they 
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 And here, it is worth noting Odysseus, a great and immortalized actor who approaches Penelope “disguised as a 
beggar and saying ‘many false things.’” (LM 107)  It is this approach which turns Penelope’s response an opening onto 
nature, a simile wherein we see “’soul as world and world as soul.’” (LM 108) 
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must not run away.” (LM 143)  That divinities were familiar to man, and yet normally far 
from sight, it was not in their being made visible that made men still pause in awe.  
Rather, awe was the outcome of recognition of an invisible order behind visibility.  And 
this we have mentioned:  “Another early word for this invisible in the midst of 
appearances is physis, nature, which according to the Greeks was the totality of all 
things...that had come into being by themselves” and of which, Heraclitus noted, “’it likes 
to hid itself,’ namely behind  the appearances.” (LM 143) 
Upon this suffered revealing, men could give reverence in speech that takes the 
form of praise, “a glorification not of a particularly amazing appearance or of the sum 
total of things in the world, but of the harmonious order behind them which itself is not 
visible and of which nevertheless the world of appearances gives us a glimpse.” (LM 
143)  Between the appearance of gods and the story of a hero amongst their ranks, we 
assume that the normally invisible harmonious order of all that is, glimpsed at by 
spectators, would be that rarity of a collapsed and shared nature between heaven made 
visible on earth.   In some way, the beholding of gods brings the invisible into the light 
along with the subsequent possibility of praise insofar as storied athanatizein of action is 
“‘reified’ only through a kind of repetition, the imitation of mimēsis…appropriate only to 
the drama” whereby “not only does this imitative element lie in repetition of a 
performance, but equally in the making or writing of the play.” (HC 187)   
Yet with the introduction of the philosophic tradition, man turned to find in his 
own spontaneous thinking ego, harmonious spectacles through the sudden advents of 
revealed invisibility made visible within himself, and with it a reorientation towards a 
new sense of spirituality.  For despite the Homeric gods “vital duration”, endless as it 
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was, it still “had a temporal beginning” – a birth and parental lineage.  Thus, philosophy 
sought beyond the divinities for a more fundamental archē, a “beginning which is itself 
unbegun, a permanent and ungenerated source of generation.” (LM 134)  What came to 
replace Olympus was that introduction by the philosophers that more than deathless, was 
also birthless: Being: “Being became the true divinity of philosophy because, in the 
famous words of Heraclitus, it was “made by none of the gods or men, but always was 
and is and shall be: an ever-living fire, fixed measures kindling and fixed measures going 
out.”” (LM 135)     
Indeed, “the great advantage of the new discipline was that man, to win his share 
of immortality, no longer needed to count on the uncertain ways of posterity.” (LM 135) 
Immortality no longer required the summing up of one’s life in a single deed and no 
longer required the spectatorship of others or poets.  Instead, this engagement with the 
immortal was carried over from Homer into the noos (Aristotle’s nous): “It is nous that 
corresponds to Being”, the harmonious order between world and universe, which led 
Aristotle and Plato to claim “that there is something in man that corresponds exactly to 
the divine because it enables him to live, as it were, in its neighborhood.” (LM 136)  That 
the contemplation of the eternal allowed for a kind of participation in it such that “[i]t is 
this divinity that causes Thinking and Being to be the same. By using his nous and by 
withdrawing mentally from all perishable things, man assimilates himself to the divine”, 
for just as Being replaces the gods, “nous, according to Aristotle...is ‘the god in us’ and 
‘every mortal life possesses the part of some god.’” (LM 136)     
   Thus, the originally invisible physis, a shared harmonious nature between 
heaven and earth which appearing gods collaterally revealed in its totality upon their 
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descending arrival, came to be replaced with the thought of being; a reconfigured 
invisible order between soul and contemplated immortal truth wherein man finds nature 
from within only by withdrawing and being extrapolated from appearing within nature’s 
advent in the world.  With the introduction of contemplated Being, the spectacle of 
heroes and approaching gods became imbued in the invisibility constitutive of thought’s 
miraculous arrival itself, the kalon of thought.  Thinking this “harmonious order...which 
is not visible and of which nevertheless the world of appearances gives us a glimpse” is 
the true engagement in Aristotle’s theōrētikē energeia, “identical with the activity of the 
gods and this, is to ‘immortalize’ (athanatizein), or to engage in an act that makes us, as 
far as possible and in ‘accordance with what is highest.’” (LM 136) It is equally for this 
reason that the contemplating man for Plato, cannot “’fail to possess immortality in the 
fullest measure that human nature admits.’” (LM 138)     
In this sense, Greek philosophy is a continuation of the ethos of their Homeric 
brethren in an aim at immortality, albeit in subsequently disfigured form.  Commensurate 
in its being carried over, this new immortality turned eternity required two parts.  Away 
from Homeric actor and spectator turned storyteller, philosophy’s assumed truth took for 
granted plurality by consolidating this two stage unfolding. First there is “...the activity of 
nous, which consisted in contemplation of the everlasting and was in itself aneu logou, 
speechless.”  (LM 137)  This thinking activity is followed by the second part, logos, not 
merely as speech but “the gift of reasoned argument.” (LM 144)  Nous, as replacement of 
the gods, and logos as substituted for sung praise, continues its privilege of the former in 
alignment with the divine: “Of these two, it is only nous that enables him to partake in the 
everlasting and the divine, while logos, designed “to say what is,”...is the specifically 
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uniquely human ability,...to what happens in the realm of human affairs and to what 
merely “seems” but is not.” (LM 137)  Hence, the admiring praise turned logos became: 
“the attempt to translate the vision into words.” (LM 137)   
Taking its cue from the vision of nous, thinking then involves a translation into 
logos wherein the philosophical criterion for truth resides.  This translation was called 
“alētheuin...and applies only to propositions about things that always and necessarily are 
and cannot be otherwise.” (LM 137)  It is because the considered nous, as a replacement 
for originally invisible physis, requires speech “not only to sound out and become 
manifest…[but] to be activated at all”, we are reminded that the invisible and visible, 
“belong together, are ‘made’ for each other, as it were.” (LM 109)    
There is another sense by which Greek philosophy is a continuation of the ethos 
of their Homeric brethren in an aim at immortality that is worth noting, specifically, the 
philosophic source in the “Homeric Simile.” (LM 108)  In true Homeric fashion, such a 
metaphor combines only visibilities such that the poet can “make known soul as world 
and world as soul.” (LM 108)  And this example we had already noted above, that where 
Odysseus, a great and immortalized actor, who approaches Penelope “disguised as a 
beggar and saying ‘many false things.’” (LM 107)  It is this approach which turns 
Penelope’s response an opening onto nature, a simile wherein we see her “’soul as world 
and world as soul.’” (LM 108)   
Upon this “fibbed” recollection, “her tears ran...and her body was melted, as the 
snow melts along the high places of the mountains when the West Wind has piled it 
there, but the South Wind melts it, and as it melts the rivers run full flood.” (LM 107)  
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Connecting only visibles, the visible tears of Penelope are associated with the running 
flood of the melting snow.  “The invisible made visible in the metaphor is the long winter 
of Odysseus’ absence, the lifeless frigidity...which now, at the first signs of hope for a 
renewal of life, begin to melt away.”  (LM 107)  Having otherwise only expressed certain 
sadness, these tears take on the meaning – “the thoughts that caused them” – and come to 
represent the thawing of a bitter long winter and the awakening of life come spring.   
Like a disguised yet familiar god who approaches man, a disguised Odysseus 
inserts himself in word and deed in what will later reveal his “who”, an act opening 
Penelope’s soul into a mirroring of the cyclical process of nature’s rule.  “Behind the 
opposition of world and soul, there must be a unity that makes the correspondence 
possible, an “unknown law.” (LM 108)  “It is the same unity that binds together all 
opposites – day and night, light and darkness, coldness and warmth – each of which is 
inconceivable in separation, unthinkable unless mysteriously related to its antithesis.” 
(LM 108)  But as we must conceded this “unknown law” outlining such polar concepts as 
a thinkable pair forms a “liminal concept...the marker of the distinction between the 
elements of the pair, the threshold between inside and outside.” (N&F 10)    
It is this liminal concept which as “a point at which revealing and concealing are 
fused” that philosophy in its withdrawal from the world fails to respect. (N&F 10)  This 
threshold of the unknown law and hidden unity between opposites becomes the unending 
theme of the philosophic tradition.  Thus, rather than an operational simile between 
visibles revealing physis, the philosopher attempts to understand the bound orders in their 
thematization and subsequent crossing between the two-faceted unfolding nous and 
logos, or a two-world theory bridged only by metaphor: “The metaphor, bridging the 
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abyss between inward and invisible mental activities and the world of appearances, was 
certainly the greatest gift language could bestow on thinking and hence philosophy, but 
the metaphor itself is poetic rather than philosophic in origin.” (LM 105)   
It becomes philosophy’s goal to bridge this gap between the invisible activity of 
thought paradoxically with thought’s outcome itself, dealing only in invisibilities and 
with the metaphorical visibility it manifests.  Thus, it is a concern with making the 
invisible an object of contemplation, “and the problem is that the Nothing cannot be 
adequately thought as the opposite of Being.” (N&F 10)  Like Merleau-Ponty’s flawed 
tacit cogito, the difficulty of understanding thinking is that, “there exists no metaphor that 
could plausibly illuminate this special activity of the mind, in which something invisible 
within us deals with the invisibilities of the world.”  (LM 124)     
It is this quest for meaning in its sheer activity of thought, the noēsis noēseōs in 
dialogue with myself that is out of order because the nous yields no end results that will 
survive its activity or make total a completed sense outside of the reach of action.  Rather, 
“[t]he only possible metaphor one may conceive of for the life of the mind is sensation of 
being alive.” (LM 123)  Like life, “[i]ts inherent law, which only a god can tolerate 
forever, man merely now and then, during which time he is godlike, is ‘unceasing 
motion, which is motion in a circle.’” (LM124)  It is “…namely, the noēsis noēseōs, 
[that] turns in circles…and is the only movement that never reaches an end or results in 
an end product.” (LM 124)  Finally, we may quote again Arendt at length: 
 If thinking were a cognitive enterprise it would have to follow a rectilinear 
motion, starting from the quest for its object and ending with cognition of it.  
Aristotle’s circular motion taken together with the life metaphor suggests a 
quest for meaning that for man as a thinking being accompanies life and ends 
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only in death.  The circular motion is a metaphor drawn from the life process, 
which though it goes from birth to death, also turns in circles as long as man 
is alive. (LM 124) 
 We had said earlier that it was from the “standpoint of nature” in its cyclical 
movement that our life spanning from birth to death seemed like a deviation from this 
common rule and eternal return. (HC 246)  It followed that, human affairs, if passively 
accepted, found themselves on a trajectory of ruin.  This doomed trajectory was thwarted 
by action.  It was action’s natal beginnings as initiated spectacular upsurge of the inter 
esse that shares in and is our “acting in” point of intersection with the automatic cyclical 
processes – an appearing “miracle” of physis as the birth or being or emergence of the 
new on the background of our mortal trajectory.   
  In The Life of the Mind, we have found analogous schematics.  From the position 
of thought, if thinking were a cognitive enterprise it would find itself on that 
aforementioned mortal trajectory.  Its own achievement, like the satisfied ends-in-
advance of fabrication, would be its very termination.  Rather, and like the light of action 
(appearing from its own infinite process only at an end) in its relation to physis, the 
making of an appearance in the thinking activity itself is a kind of birth, a making visible 
that which is invisible as solicited in return from the sensory, what we have called the 
kalon of thought.  And yet, as we have demonstrated, “the standpoint of nature” is never 
entirely distinct from the status quo of the human condition.  Acting into our conditioned 
nature as a conditioning of our powers to act suggests that the ends of thinking are not 
determined but follow in their own wake and in the wake of other thoughts.   
It is here we recollect our since shifted movement from action to thought.  Since 
early immortality was linked to the revealing of physis, and since contemplation of being 
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became a sufficient means of engagement with immortality, we can understand the 
substitution of immortal divinities with being as involved in a substitution concerning 
nature itself.  From our original physis, nature becomes Being and Being, as our being 
conditioned, is that which has been shown to be between us.  Thus, the endless and 
invisible circular motion of thought dealing in absences made present, metaphorically 
linked to the life processes from birth to death and sharing in nature’s cyclical and eternal 
return by virtue of its own cycling noēsis noēseōs, appears from nowhere and equally 
must “look like a miracle.”  It is because thought never abandons the preconditions for 
action that Arendt can close her primary seminal work and open her last with the words 
of Cato: “Never is he more active than when he does nothing, never is he less alone than 
when he is by himself.” (HC 325)   
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Chapter Three: Convergence and Birth 
Within this third chapter it will be our task to merge our reflections on our two 
central authors toward a genuine account of natality, showing birth as institutional and 
showing institutional sequel as a kind of re-birth.  This chapter will proceed by outlining 
a convergence between the flesh of Merleau-Ponty and the inter esse of Arendt insofar as 
both concepts bespeak of a fruitful dialectical relationship between invisibility and 
visibility wherein the new is born, coming to appear through our conditioned nature as 
the visible in its intimate relationship to the temporal characteristic of the invisible. 
In this way we argue that Merleau-Ponty and Hannah Arendt can be read as 
sharing a deep concern for the roles of visibility and invisibility, appearing and non-
appearing, in their respective philosophies.  For Merleau-Ponty, flesh and institution have 
suggested the visible as both differentiated upon invisibility and as exposing this 
invisibility as a temporal index constitutive of the instance of institutional sequel.  
Likewise, for Arendt, action in its relation to natality, the inter esse, and her cyclical 
nature as physis speak of a particular instance of visibility, that of our conditioning, 
witnessed as the advent of the invisible in the midst of visibility and as the totality of all 
things.  Ultimately, it is this relation that can serve as a hermeneutic bridge that allows 
both thinkers to be read in tandem.  Crucially important for a genuine account of natality 
is the implications of their respective views on temporality as aligned with the invisible 
that makes its appearance within visibility as the emergence of the new. 
Thus, having made commensurate flesh and inter esse, the second section 
explores an exposed and shared temporal structure of the present necessary for our 
reformulation of birth - for Merleau-Ponty a “quasi-eternity” of lived instants between 
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times exchanged and for Arendt the eternity of the nunc stans.  Reflection on their shared 
temporal structures provides a common divergence or decentering indicative of the 
present in its certain absence or recessional quality.  
Finally, with the present as absence we outline the mechanisms for institutional 
sequel.  This allows us to see that birth satisfies the outlined preconditions for action and 
is that instant that both decenters the institution into which the new makes its appearance 
while equally marking the newcomers inauguration within the very institution in 
question.  Because birth necessarily occurs in plurality, emerges in-between persons, and 
commences a disclosure and response to the question of “who?”, birth will be seen as an 
upsurge within the inter esse or a passing into flesh by bearing the former’s structure of 
dissemination; like the “who” witnessed only by others birth is paradoxically one’s own 
and yet never an event in one’s life, an invisible or unconscious origin never fully 
appropriable and carried through subsequent institutional events as a kind of re-birth.  
This invisibility of our birth will be foundational for all subsequent invisibilities involved 
in the reckoning with our differentiated and unfolding visible present.  As a kind of 
invisible recession at our origin and in our present, our birth as the flesh from which we 
pass is always the unfolding into the Merleau-Pontyan flesh of those others whose 
appearance in anticipatory ek-stasis was like a lifelong preparation for our arrival. 
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3:1 Flesh, Inter Esse, and their Convergence 
 
Surely some revelation is at hand;/ Surely the Second 
Coming is at hand./  The Second Coming!  Hardly are those 
words out/ When a vast image out of the Spiritus Mundi/ 
Trouble my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert/ A 
shape with lion body and the head of a man/ A gaze blank 
and pitiless as the sun, is moving its slow thighs...And what 
rough beast, its hour come round at last/ Slouches toward 
Bethlehem to be born? 
-W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming
52
 
To summarize our findings, early Merleau-Ponty introduced us to the tacit cogito.  
Not quite the informing body and not yet spoken, this “I see that I see” was the 
experience and cradle of consciousness mediating across inverse sides of a single 
structure; from one’s originary orientation of mute body/world co-incarnation breaching 
the threshold of consciousness from which expressive gestures took flight.  This crossing 
would teach us our thoughts if we lend ourselves to this precarious dawning, this silence 
of consciousness embracing the world of speech – “like that of the infant at its first 
breath…” (PhP 470)  The tacit cogito as the “infant at its first breath” was our first natal 
analogy.  It was the entrance of the new from non-being, an entrance from forever 
concealed spatio-temporal depths providing impetus for its surfacing cry.   
Such a metaphor for the experience of consciousness produced an irreconcilable 
transcendentalism between two orders paradoxically unable to intersect by definition yet 
co-dependent on each other for their very existence.  Analogous with 
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Limited, 2000), 159. 
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“…consciousness…seen as the peak of an iceberg, a mere indication of the floating mass 
of unconsciousness beneath it” the tacit cogito was undemonstratable in its own terms: 
“the moment a fragment of unconsciousness reaches the peak of the iceberg it has 
become conscious and has lost all the properties of its alleged origin.” (LM 113)  
Likewise, the tacit cogito as pre-linguistic mediator is betrayed in its explicit formulation 
having lost “properties of its alleged [silent] origin.” (LM 113)  The tacit cogito was then 
the consideration of an empty and relative consciousness entirely outside itself yet 
exactly coextensive with its formulated being, comparable to the consideration of our 
entrance at birth from presupposed origins in non-being.  And insofar as the tacit cogito, 
like our birth, was meant to mediate us into direct conscious contact with the world, such 
conclusions only pointed to a two-world theory comprised of a cognitive latency 
underscored by carnal immediacy - the object (or our birth) “perceive[d] as a residue” 
rather than in its “ontological originality.” (RVI 284)   
The tacit cogito as an ontological substitution for the experience of the conscious 
life for which it is meant to account allowed us to turn to Arendt who recognized within 
the thinking ego the same function: “…the chief difficulty here seems to be that for 
thinking itself – whose language is entirely metaphorical…there exists no metaphor that 
could plausibly illuminate this special activity…The only possible metaphor…for the life 
of the mind is the sensation of being alive.” (LM 123)  Hence: “…[for] the philosopher, 
speaking out of the experience of the thinking ego, man is quite naturally not just word 
but thought made flesh, the always mysterious, never fully elucidated incarnation of the 
thinking capability…” (LM 47)  And it was with Merleau-Ponty’s flesh that we grounded 
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our worldly installment straddling an awareness never fully elucidated and found gestures 
towards a new conception of birth. 
Flesh then, was commensurate but not latent or prior to the flesh of our body:  
“The flesh is the body inasmuch as it is the visible seer, the audible hearer, the tangible 
touch – the sensitive sensible: inasmuch as in it is accomplished an equivalence of 
sensibility and sensible thing.” (VI Iiv)  It was our synergetic body as both anchored in 
and perpetuator of flesh that continually moved through its accumulated temporal 
recession into the unfolding latter by a reversibility within the world, ushering in the very 
fields and perpetuated passageways harbored within flesh’s expanding thickness (spatial, 
cultural, mythological, ideological, and as domains of knowledge).  
  This bodily opening of flesh as simultaneous with a movement through 
subsequently opened fields demonstrated flesh as an element of our existence: “…to 
designate it we should need the old term ‘element’…in the sense of a general thing, 
midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle 
that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being.” (VI 139)   
Yet, Merleau-Ponty notes of this elemental quality: “We must not think of flesh 
starting from substances, from body and spirit” least be led into contradictions. (VI 147)  
Our extended flesh it is not a positing within a consciousness paradoxically both inside 
and outside itself, for “this interiorly worked-over mass, has no name in philosophy.” (VI 
147)  Rather, because is “resides in a unique place and moment: one can indeed say of 
my body that is not elsewhere, but one cannot say that it is here or now in the sense that 
objects are.” (VI 147)  It is because this unconscious element and bodily reversibility are 
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“always immanent and never realized in fact” that flesh’s elemental being institutes us as 
both inside and outside ourselves through its very fidelity to “the interplay of presence 
and absence as prior to those apparently constitutive elements.”  (BA 212)   
To expand then, flesh is this absence comprised of the unconscious and invisible 
temporality - a constellatory “non-figurative framework” between one’s synergetic body 
and the opened perceptual horizon, it’s “absent” beyond still given within experience 
itself. (SMIM 114)  It is the curvatures provided between them whereby the field is 
institutionally outlined and traversed by pursuing the vanishing points provided.  Thus 
opened flesh and field as the perceived is an “ensemble of my body’s routes” in its 
recessional index - possible Gestalts the world invites by Rückgestaltung resulting in “an 
openness upon a field of Gestaltungen – And that means perception is unconsciousness.” 
(VI 189/243)   
As unconscious, perception was demonstrated as a “cohesion without concept, 
(which is of the same type as the cohesion of the parts of my body)” wherein time opens 
before our eyes in its vibration, “echoes in the totality of the world” and hence bears the 
possibility of harmonizing and inverting its temporal components as we make our way 
through the field. (VI 152)  Its visible upsurge came to be exhibited and differentiated 
along the temporal invisibility of the flesh in dimensions, levels, “the pilings of the world; 
we discover the world in degrees, in distance, in depth, and in difference.” (VI Iv)  Thus, 
appearance from flesh was a crystallization differentiated on “…immediate non-presence, 
but perspective understood as opening beyond, leading to it by its very thickness…” such 
that “each perception is a vibration of the world, it touches well beyond what it touches, it 
awakens echoes in all my being in the world…” (IP 6/165)       
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Already pulled into its dawning movement, perception was also described as an 
“elemental event by which the flesh captures the lines of force of the world, brings itself 
up to the levels about which visibility is modulated and rises upright before vertical 
being” in an “elemental alliance with the invisible light.” (VI Iv/IP x)  Like Cézanne’s 
vibrating objects subtly illuminating from within and leading us towards a source never 
fully elucidated perception’s “light is never entirely in the present.” (IP 52)  Thus, 
perception returns us to the notion of a field as outlined and structured in its horizonal 
absence, an absence of the beyond still given to experience insofar as it is “not first of 
things but perception of elements…rays of the world, things which are dimensions, which 
are worlds…” (VI 210)   
The field then, comprised of these vibrating visible and invisible elements is 
traversable in the institutional routes it provides insofar as it “straddles its future, has its 
future, its temporality…” (IP 8)  This was recognized by Merleau-Ponty as early as the 
writings of Signs where he notes: “It is by time that my thoughts are dated.  It is by time 
too that they make a date, open a future for thought – a cycle, a field…Thought does not 
bore through time.  It follows in the wake of previous thoughts…” and does so at this 
very peripheral and structuring spatio-temporal horizonal edge. (Signs 14)  And insofar 
as the other, with his body is his own vibrations and ek-stasis presides over a region, he, 
both inside and outside himself in absence, is equally “not in the here and in the now, 
but…is not intemporal and a-spatial either.” (VI 218)   
Indeed, the perceived as the aforementioned unconscious “ensemble of my body’s 
routes” was writ large in the ensemble of co-instituting and co-reversing bodies upon one 
another as the foundation for the unfolding of flesh.  Bodies turn back in a co-reversibility 
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that “defines the flesh [that] exists in other fields”, those other fields into which we cross 
by an unconscious intercorporeality between bodily recesses and the chiasm that opens 
between them.  This chiasm of invisible recesses between us, between commensurable 
ek-stases stretching into the horizonal beyond is our temporal contingency that allows us, 
at its very vanishing threshold, to understand one another to the best that our 
contingencies would allow.  Together then, we perpetuate the very flesh of which we are 
born insofar as field, self, and other, with inner and outer horizons of ek-stases are a 
“passage of freedom.” (VI 144/IP 36)  Like flesh, this freedom announces itself silently, 
acutely, and undeniably as different people from different places are united by its 
ineluctable force. Our encounter’s as arrangements of crises, traditions, and placements 
of material elements cuts through monadic cynicism.     
Concerning the institutional nature of this passage within flesh and field between 
us, Merleau-Ponty tells us that the “relationship between logical objectivity and carnal 
intersubjectivity” - what we have call intercorporeality - “is precisely a Fundierung”: 
“Logical objectivity derives from carnal intersubjectivity assuming it has been forgotten 
as carnal intersubjectivity and carnal intersubjectivity makes this forgetfulness by 
wending its way to logical objectivity.” (Signs 173)  And, it was our first definition of 
institution “in the strong sense” that hinged on the possibility of objective thought over 
the anonymous side of the body: “…[a] symbolic matrix that results in the openness of a 
field, of a future according to certain dimensions, and from this result…the possibility of 
a common adventure and of a history as consciousness.” (IP13) 
  In this way, the history of consciousness depends on the unconscious.  And 
perception as unconscious had returned us to the field insofar as it is “not first of things 
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but perception of elements…of rays of the world, things which are dimensions, which are 
worlds…” (VI 210)  That things harbor dimensions and worlds, we can say of objective 
contemplation as an entrance into them: “to think is not to posses the objects of thought; 
it is to use them to mark out a realm, to think about that which we therefore are not 
thinking about.” (Signs 160)  Thus, the objects of contemplation as “worlds” are 
perpetuated in their domain by that reflective act opening their dormant invisibility or 
“unthought-of” element as the re-cast horizonal line which constitutes their field as a 
domain of knowledge. (Signs 160)  Indeed, the aforementioned “common adventure and 
a history as consciousness” is such that reflection, not over against the unreflected but 
over against reflection of bodily opened flesh means that thought never transcends the 
fleshy fields from which it is sourced.  That flesh can open in reflection and yet that 
reflection never escapes flesh suggests a compression of invisibilities, including the often 
interchangeable or synonymous possibility of an over-determination - institutional sequel 
as a given understanding of other ek-stasis in their temporal absence commensurate with 
the aforementioned passageway to certain freedoms.  
   Hence, there is a possibility of fleshly intercourse whereby we pass into one 
another, inhabit one another, and can consider each other’s behavior and thoughts.  This 
compression of the invisible contingencies over against themselves, in over-
determination, yields the possibility of flesh being glimpsed in a charged instance of 
compressed temporality whereby the time that is opens in witnessed temporal fissure and 
exposed understanding – the Stiftung of an institutional event or sequel: 
...is being at a distance, it is the double ground of my life of consciousness, 
and it is what makes there be able to be Stiftung not only of an instant but of a 
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whole system of temporal indexes – time (already as time of the body, 
taximeter, which are openness upon being). (VI 173)   
  The field, comprised of a temporally rich “lateral kinship of all the ‘nows’” and 
opened in Rückgestaltung can draw upon and compress the “unthought-of” elements such 
that the stand of reflection (the noēsis noēseōs) can open the displaced time that is now in 
vibrating fissure: “…the forces of the constitutive field do not move in one direction 
only; they turn back upon themselves.” (Signs 173)  This over-determined 
accomplishment/outcome upon the compression of eye and mind we had analogized with 
the “rogue wave” wherein the velocity of different wakes combine to point a significantly 
elevated crest towards a new direction by which to follow.  Concerning this reorientation, 
we note that “[t]he field is, not an order of essences, but cultural cores (phrases, moments 
of thought) around which this Nachvollzug (reoperation) pivots.” (IP 61)  And it is this 
pivotal moments of reoperation, reorientation, and temporal exposure that we call 
institutional sequel - that call for pause to think that shows the past and present as 
Ineinander and provides the signposting movement of experience by which to return in 
further continuance of a historically contingent sensibility:     
Thereby by institution, we were intending here those events in an experience 
which endow the experience with durable dimensions, in relation to which a 
whole series of other experiences will make sense, will form a thinkable 
sequel or history – or again events which deposit sense in me, not just as 
something surviving as a residue, but as the call to follow, the demand of a 
future. (IP x) 
 As a result of these findings, we found that birth could no longer be conceived in 
the metaphor of the tacit cogito, the entrance of someone from a non-being conceivable 
in thought.  Rather, we were left with the musings of Goethe, who found himself situated 
in a temporally compressed historical origin wherein history was read differently: “In 
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other places one reads from the outside in; here we imagine we are reading from the 
inside-out – everything lies spread around us and also extends out from us.”
53
   It was 
here that Goethe found himself born again by that which was left for him: “...and I count 
the day when I entered Rome as my second natal day, a true rebirth...This rebirth, which 
is remolding me from within.”54     
To be sure, sequel speaks of repetition under a continued thematic or rubric of 
sensibility, a moment drawing its meaning and understanding from prior establishment.  
Arendt notes that “from the viewpoint of homo faber, it is like a miracle, like the 
revelation of divinity, that meaning should have a place in this world.” (HC 236)  It was 
the revelation or unconcealment of a divinity that we aligned with the making visible of 
physis: “something familiar and yet normally invisible…the harmonious order behind 
them which itself is not visible and of which nevertheless the world of appearances gives 
us a glimpse.” (LM 143)  The earliest word for “the invisible in the midst of the 
appearances [physis]…[was] nature, which according to the Greeks was the totality of all 
things.” (LM 143)  This nature was made visible by an approaching God or 
immortalizing act as the most meaningful experience a Homeric Greek could witness.  
Gods and acting men sharing in the same physis and both capable of producing kalon 
revealed nature as the appearing totality of all things.  It was this revealing that was an 
opened spectacle cleaving between action and action, the precarious birth of being only 
insofar as it is that by which to follow and further act through.  This was the emergence 
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of the new, which like the Stiftung of an institutional event (experienced from within 
while “being at a distance” as “the double ground of my life of consciousness”), was 
always so by being both included in the kalon while equally being kept at a distance from 
it as its outstanding quality. (VI 173)  Hence, we begin to see an analogous connection 
between Merleau-Ponty’s institutional event or sequel and the making visible of physis.  
But to continue with our summary of Arendt, we had established that the 
conditions of this meaningful appearance were sourced in the set-in-motion inter esse 
wherein an action took impetus, satisfied the qualifications to become an entelecheia, and 
vibrated back within a web of human relations.  As the highest possible human activity, 
action was outlined by Aristotle’s energeia: “activities that do not pursue an end (are 
ateleis) and leave no work behind (no par’ autas erga) but exhaust their full meaning in 
the performance itself.” (HC 206)  It was in this experience of a full actuality, where “the 
end (telos) is not pursued but lies in the activity itself which therefore becomes an 
entelecheia (full reality)...[and where] the performance is the work, is energeia (full 
actuality).” (HC 206)  This was why Arendt noted that the two aforementioned 
Aristotelian concepts (energeia and entelecheia) are interrelated: “...full actuality 
(energeia) effects and produces nothing besides itself, and full reality (entelecheia) has 
no other end besides itself. (HC 206)  Within a plurality, qualified action in its fullness 
could mirror the full light of the entelecheia to which it responds, beaming forth from a 
background of convention in meaningful presence as the emergence of the new, the birth 
of being through action’s natal links.     
Further, we had established that such action bearing the new held the power to 
save the realm of human affairs.  We can recall that human affairs if passively accepted 
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found themselves on a merely mortal trajectory.  From the viewpoint of nature in its 
cyclical movement our life spanning from birth to death seemed like a deviation from this 
common rule of eternal return.  It was action as vinculum with this cyclicality that 
brought salvation; in its links with natal beginnings action as initiated upsurge of the 
conditioned inter esse was that “acting in” point of intersection with nature’s automatic 
cyclical processes – “a miracle” on the background of our mortal trajectory. (HC 247)  
Physis then, as action’s spectacular outcome and point of intersection with nature in its 
return was revealed to converge directly with (and take upsurge from) that inter esse 
whereby the act’s aim into our conditioned nature was equally a continued conditioning 
of our nature (as aligned with the inter esse) and our capacities to perform qualified acts: 
“Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately 
assumes the character of a condition of human existence.” (HC 9)  It was for this reason 
that birth, the entrance of the newcomer taking up that which he has inherited could save 
the world: “The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal 
‘natural’ ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is 
ontologically rooted…” (HC 247)          
Cyclicality was extended in The Life of the Mind.  Away from, but not 
abandoning the earlier Homeric emphasis on the quality of spectacular appearance, 
contemplation of being became a sufficient means of engagement with the immortal 
turned eternal.  Meaningful appearance was subsequently sublimated through its own 
extracted displacement by philosophic reflection away from the public space of a 
plurality and into a withdrawn cycle between one and oneself - the noēsis noēseōs 
situating meaning as the mnemonic and metaphorical return of thought in its own 
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temporally conditioned nature.  Thus, we were able to extend this being conditioned and 
the prolongation of a mortal trajectory by a natal “miracle” within the thinking activity 
itself – what we called the kalon of thinking.   This was because we found that from the 
position of the life of the mind, if thinking were a cognitive enterprise it would find itself 
on a mortal trajectory analogous to those of human affairs as circumvented by action’s 
intersection with nature’s circular movement: “If thinking were a cognitive enterprise it 
would have to follow a rectilinear motion, starting from the quest for its object and 
ending with cognition of it.” (LM 124)  Its cognitive achievement as outlined in the 
means-to-ends structure of fabrication would conclude its own motion having 
extinguished within the ends outside itself.   
Indeed fabricating man, homo faber, considered it a miracle that meaning should 
have a place in the world.  In contradistinction to cognition or fabrication then, “where 
the light by which to judge the finished product is provided by the image or model 
perceived beforehand”, thinking, withdrawn in-itself with no metaphor for its sheer 
cyclical activity except for the sensation of being alive, flashes in endless metaphor like 
the “light that illuminates processes of action…[appearing] only at their end.”: (HC 
192/VI Iv)    
Aristotle’s circular motion taken together with the life metaphor suggest a 
quest for meaning that for man as a thinking being accompanies life and ends 
only in death.  The circular motion is a metaphor drawn from the life process, 
which though it goes from birth to death, also turns in circles as long as man 
is alive. (LM 124) 
Having reviewed our findings, we see in the noēsis noēseōs an important point of 
return, at the threshold of those liminal concepts of life and death defined only in 
opposition, and it is at this point where we must locate institutional sequel (an over-
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determined instant of exposed invisible contingencies as the temporal index to the time 
that is), qualified action (the convergence of energeia and entelecheia beaming forth 
from a background of convention in meaningful presence at an instance of revealed 
physis/the birth of being), and our qualified insertion into nature as a natal miracle or 
birth.   
We need to understand the expansion of appearing physis towards its 
sublimation/expansion within the contemplation of eternal being as carried over in an 
institution of nature, considering nature’s cyclical and eternal return of an appearing 
nature within the noēsis noēseōs of thought.  We need to understand a shift from that 
between-(wo)men to the between-(wo)men inserted in one’s very reflection, between one 
and oneself opening a kind of inter esse from withdrawn anonymity which does not fail 
to carry the world and others along with it.  Physis, the revealed harmonious orders of the 
invisible in the midst of the visible, as an early word for nature in its eternal cyclical 
return, is not external to us but becomes imbued in the very noēsis noēseōs of the 
thinking ego in metaphorical re-turn; the endless and invisible circular motion of thought, 
dealing in absences mnemonically returned to the present as metaphor, sharing in its own 
eternal re-cycling that appears from nowhere, must like action in its relation to birth, 
“look like a miracle.” (HC 236)  Like flesh, the inter esse between us is something that 
we never transcend in the withdrawal of the mind.  Rather, we have a withdrawal from 
the public space of action to accessing the anonymity of ourselves which like Arendt’s 
“who” remains in-between persons.  Within the noēsis noēseōs we locate an important 
point of return – not action in its public appearance, but also not an entire departure from 
action and its outcome as witnessed physis or the Stiftung of institutional sequel.    
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To begin the convergence of our two authors we begin by putting them on a 
common term indicative of visibility and appearance: nature.  Considering cyclical 
nature’s appearing at physis and the cyclical and appearing return of the noēsis noēseōs, 
we can now turn to Merleau-Ponty’s revision of Schelling’s cyclical Naturphilosophie: 
“[t]he circularity of knowing places us not in front of, but rather in the middle of the 
Absolute.” (NA 47)  Indeed, Arendt notes that Schelling was seized “with vertigo at the 
rim of the abyss…suppressed by the insight that ‘Being is necessary, [made so] that is, by 
the absolute affirmation of Being in cognition.’” (LM 146)  But via the above 
dissemination of the Absolute, Merleau-Ponty recuperates Schelling’s important cyclical 
contribution: “Just as our intuition is an ek-stasis, by which we try to situate ourselves in 
the absolute, so too must the Absolute leave itself and make itself into the World.” (NA 
47) Merleau-Ponty continues:  
Schelling presents the appearance of human being as a species of the re-
creation of the world, as the advent of an opening. By this opening, Nature, 
when it succeeds in creating human being, finds itself overcome by 
something new.  But the inverse is also true.  Not only must Nature become 
vision, but human being must also become Nature: ‘Philosophers, in their 
visions became Nature.’” (NA 47) 
It is with this recuperation that we put Arendt and Merleau-Ponty on similar terms, 
insofar as nature for both authors becomes a part of our being conditioned.  There is first 
“a sort of natural teleology (our senses function by the institution of Nature).” (NA 226)  
There is a “…circularity between nature and persons” as the “…urpräsentierbare…the 
whole of the world…and as such it encompasses persons who, in another connection in 
which they are expressively made explicit, encompass Nature as the object they 
constitute in common.” (Signs 171 italics mine)   
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Being then, is not “’necessary, [made so] that is, by the absolute affirmation of 
Being in cognition’” as Schelling suspected. (LM 146)  It is not what is in itself for 
someone, but what  “is ready to be developed according to another becoming of 
knowledge, like a constellation whose figure would be continuously remade according to 
[a] project which appoints such changes as possible.” (IP 61)  It is this development and 
change that we link to the aforementioned “connection in which they [persons] are 
expressively made explicit”, at that moment when in taking a stand to oneself in thought, 
“Nature becomes the noema it has always been, nature reintegrated into the 
consciousness which has always constituted it through and through.” (Signs 171/NA 162)  
This moment we have called physis, the birth of being at the exposure of our 
conditioning, included but being kept at a distance as part of its outstanding quality.  This 
is synonymous with that institutional event wherein the time that is exposes an index of 
temporality proper to it: “The ‘Institution of Nature’…makes us have ‘natural 
judgments,’ that is, ‘to interpret’ the action of things as if we divinely knew…” (NA 222)   
 Insofar as the noēsis noēseōs never abandons its earlier Homeric emphasis of the 
appearance of physis in its harmonious orders, that its endless and invisible circular 
motion equally and metaphorically appears “like a miracle”, we can reconsider Arendt’s 
reflection on action in terms of circular thought when she says: “the smallest act in the 
most limited circumstance bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, 
and sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation.” (HC 236/190)  Indeed, 
the smallest thought from the most limited circumstance and contingency can suffice to 
change its very invisible constellation and opened field “according to [a] project which 
appoints such changes as possible.” (IP 61)  Just as thought never leaves the flesh from 
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which it is sourced, thought never leave the conditioned inter esse from which it 
withdraws only by carrying that between men and the possibilities of appearance along 
with it.  Hence, Merleau-Ponty’s “…whenever I try to understand myself, the whole 
fabric of the perceptible world comes too, and with it comes the others who are caught in 
it” can be seen as synonymous with Arendt’s quoting of Cato: “Never is he more active 
when he does nothing, never is he less alone than when he is by himself.” (Signs 15/HC 
325)   
Our first convergence between Arendt and Merleau-Ponty puts us on common 
terms, a shared sense of nature, not merely subjugated to man’s critical gaze but where 
man comes to inhabit nature as his being conditioned in his very vision.  Nature is lodged 
in the dynamic of making visible, is the becoming of this dynamic’s very outcome, and 
finally, is that exposed in totality at the birth of being.  It is the latter of these as the 
“advent of an opening” wherein exists the possibility of “acting-in” to the eternal cycle of 
nature appearing anew and finds itself overcome by something new in its very being.  We 
have said that of this conditioned nature that thought never transcends it, never leaves its 
grounds found in the inter esse.  Indeed, “[w]hoever understood this also understood 
Naturphilosophie is in no way a theory, but rather a life within Nature.”  (NA 47)   
Having made our first convergence by putting Merleau-Ponty and Arendt on a 
common term locating that appearing point of our being, our becoming conditioned, and 
the birth of the new, we move toward the invisibilities upon which this appearing 
visibility is differentiated.  Our focus turns to the invisible aspects within the work of 
Arendt compared to the invisibility of flesh upon which the visible is differentiated.  This 
allows us to reconsider the just explored “advent of an opening” as what we will see in 
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Arendt as the present in “metaphorical divergence”, a shift comparable to the decentering 
of an institution at its Stiftung or institution in its “nascent state.” (IP 7)   
Traced throughout Arendt, we saw a shifting invisible quotient.  In The Human 
Condition, invisibles included the unpredictable outcomes accounted for by the endless 
process character of initiated action and one’s own “who” this very action disclosed: 
“like the daimōn in Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, 
always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he 
encounters.” (HC 179)  This suggested a common structure of deferral within plurality 
outlined the inter esse as determining the qualifications of action and its actor’s 
subsequent identity in deferred negation to witnessing others.  These “uncertain 
certainties” indicative of action laid the foundation for the possibility of a revealed 
miracle, an instance of immortality dependent on reification to sustain a cyclical return in 
the finite present. 
And yet, by virtue of our mortality, the movement of a life spanning between birth 
and death, our qualified action as vinculum with nature’s eternally returning cycle and as 
aligned with the inter esse, is never without its own trajectory.   The trajectory between 
conditioned cycling and immortalizing acts is made clear by Anne O’Byrne: “the 
temporality of ancient political immortals stands out against the cyclical temporality of 
natural life, refusing to be folded back into a natural flow and instead forging forward at a 
tangent to the circle.” (N&F 82)   
It is here at the point of this ever important tangent where we locate action in its 
natal intersection with nature or the “advent of [it’s] opening”, opening a kind of 
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appearing divinity on earth by moving forward while recoiling backward. (NA 47)  The 
circling return of our conditioned nature is seen to be an elliptical orbit dragged along by 
the forward forging and interrupting tangent of action in their displaced intersection at the 
emergence of the new.  Action as entelecheia is only so by its intersection to the orbiting 
nature/inter esse such that the tangent is not stubbornly headlong but bent by the 
curvature of the latter’s cyclical return that provides the new in its very difference.   It is 
this zero point intersection between tangent and cycle where our aforementioned miracle 
is made, nature’s visible “advent of an opening”, the aforementioned threshold of those 
liminal concepts (birth and death defined only in their opposition), and a re-cycling 
recuperation from an otherwise mortal trajectory. (NA 47)   
Institutionally, the visible intersection of this tangent as appearing from 
invisibility is a sequel resuming what was in dis-continuity.  It is the signaled new from 
the contingency of the old in its very departure from it.  Thus our aforementioned 
Arendtian “miracles” (an appearance of a harmonious order or of a timely and succinct 
thought that resonates through a sedimented logos in its very compression) are the visible 
intersecting of tangent (action and emergence of the new), and orbit (as those exposed 
contingences from which the new emerges), pulling one another to lay the foundational 
running route of the present by way of their meeting; the conditioned re-cycling of the 
inter esse as a certain nature that centripetally orbits the time that is.  Anne O’Byrne 
agrees when she says that this “forging forward at a tangent to the circle” is “the 
temporality of the Olympian gods, who unlike the later Christian God, were in fact 
creatures subject to time.” (N&F 82) For noted in our second chapter to be expanded on 
in the subsequent section, it was only those acts in their full temporality as full 
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entelecheia which stood out as shining examples of an operating institutional ethos, 
suffered like a pathos, and to be followed in further revealing of the divine.  This 
intersection and interplay of tangent and cycle made visible is the miracle which reveals 
immortality, a type of eternity as the very infinite in a finite present that is “forging 
forward.”   
This “forging forward” of action finds itself in relation to the invisible activity of 
the thinking ego (despite lacking public appearance).  For as we saw in The Life of the 
Mind, the cyclical return of the noēsis noēseōs as the quest for meaning was an expansion 
of the cyclical return of revealed physis.  The noēsis noēseōs equally provided us with the 
since shifted quality of sequel in contradistinction to perfect repetition by virtue of its 
own invisible characteristics as seen in the blind bard.  As blind, he sings only what 
Mnemosyne, “who watches over Remembrance, has put into his mind.  The Muse gave 
him good and bad: she deprived him of eyesight and gave him sweet song.” (LM 132)   
The meaning of an act or event while it is happening is revealed only when it has 
come to a close and has disappeared:  “[R]emembrance, by which you make present to 
your mind what actually is absent and past, reveals the meaning in the form of a story.” 
(LM 133)  The storyteller “is not involved in the appearances; he is blind, shielded 
against the visible, in order to be able to “see” the invisible…[W]hat he sees with blind 
eyes and puts into words is the story, not the deed itself and not the doer.” (LM 133)  
Thus, the basic structure of the thinking deals with things that are absent or invisible.  It 
deals with experiences “that have disappeared from my senses…[to be] summoned up 
and made present to my mind” only by having been de-sensed and solicited back in re-
contextualization by the current sensorial experience that harkens to it. (LM 85)   
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Recall then, that invisible absence made metaphorically present by the forever 
invisible activity of the thinking ego is our second example of a “miracle” away from a 
dying trajectory.  Continued from the physis of the Homeric Greeks, we discover that 
thought, making what is absent metaphorically appear qualifies as that located divergent 
tangent to what would otherwise be a stagnant repeating cycle in exactness and decline.  
Metaphor in its displaced return achieves equilibrium between the sensorial experience 
and invisible made visible divergence.   
  Metaphorical with the experience of life itself, the thinking ego’s sheer activity 
bends back in withdrawal in an anachronistic scan and climax, providing metaphor to 
bridge the forever invisible mental activity with speech suitable for the world of 
appearances: “And it is in this context that the mind’s language by means of metaphor 
returns to the world of visibilities to illuminate and elaborate further what cannot be seen 
but can be said.” (LM 109)  Institutional itself, language as “[a]nalogies, metaphors, and 
emblems…are the threads by which the mind holds on to the world even when, 
absentmindedly, it has lost direct contact with it, and they guarantee the unity of human 
experience.”  It is for this reason Merleau-Ponty tells us “we live in a world where speech 
is an institution” and Arendt tells us that “the end of thinking can never be an intuition” 
needing speech to make itself manifest. (PhP 213/LM 121)  Thus, “that the world of 
appearances reminds us of things non-apparent, [and] may be seen as a kind of ‘proof’ 
that mind and body, thinking and sense-experience, the invisible and the visible, belong 
together, are ‘made’ for each other, as it were.” (LM 109)   
  In this way, consciousness and language are found on the side of institution and 
no longer located on a transcendental plane as with the example of the tacit cogito.  We 
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are all subject to the “paradoxical condition of a living being that, though itself a part of 
the world of appearances, is in possession of a faculty, the ability to think, that permits 
the mind to withdraw from the world without ever being able to leave it or transcend it.” 
(LM 45)  Our reflections (never against the unreflected and only over against reflection) 
never leave the flesh or inter esse from whence they came and to which they return.  
It is here we can finalize our comparison of Arendt’s invisibilities to those of 
Merleau-Ponty. As we summarized above, it was the synergetic body in it temporal 
recessional and unconscious index that opened flesh in its very absence.  The 
subsequently opened field bore its spatio-temporal horizonal beyond within experience as 
these very invisibilities on which perception and thought were differentiated - ek-stases 
which opened their invisibilities toward oncoming visibility.  Arendt’s invisibility 
involved a latent, metaphorical return from oblivion, manifesting meaning and bearing 
the potential to shine upon a sort of revealed physis within the kalon of thought 
(simultaneously imbuing man anew in his very Nature).  In this way, appearance, or the 
making visible for both authors is contingent on invisible sources.  For Arendt, this 
invisible source is within the inter esse wherein aimed action resulted in a differed and 
ephemeral “who.”  This source was expanded into the invisible source of thought 
revealing to ourselves a metaphorical representation of our “who” as already explored in 
Kant (“in the consciousness of myself in the sheer thinking activity, I am the thing itself 
although nothing of myself is thereby given for thought”55).  Merleau-Ponty sourced this 
invisible background within the flesh, on the side of shared anonymity or 
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unconsciousness.  Hence we find our “who” not in ourselves but in what becomes our 
unconscious retuned to us only in and through others.  And insofar as the fleshly fields 
opened by reflection could never transcend the invisible source of flesh, and the noēsis 
noēseōs of thought never abandoned it ties with the inter esse at the appearance of physis, 
we can merge both central concepts with that quote of Cato closing Arendt’s seminal 
work: “Never is he more active than when he does nothing, never is he less alone than 
when he is by himself.” (HC 325)   
   We have demonstrated flesh and inter esse as both bespeaking a fruitful dialectic 
insofar as their commensurate temporal invisibilities provided for the visible in its 
intimate relationship with nature.  By now opening both flesh and inter esse in their inner 
workings, we may suggest that an institutional event is recycled in its meaning by the 
structure of metaphor; the institutional Stiftung as metaphorical for re-birth and aligned 
with the only working metaphor for the thinking ego, the conditioned sensation of being 
alive.  Of institutional sequel, those “events in an experience which endow the experience 
with a durable dimension” while providing the “demand of a future”, we can now 
advance the claim that they are synonymous with the metaphorical divergence implied in 
the works of Arendt.  The divergent nature of metaphor, as a distancing between 
instances, will be seen as a tangent from an otherwise exact replication - the emergence 
or birth of the new rather than exact fabrication or duplication.  It is the metaphorical 
quality of this return and reactivation that is the distancing divergence constituting the 
trajectory around which institution pivots in its ever cyclical orbiting and present 
intersection as “institution in its nascent state.” (IP 7)  Yeats’ poem cited above 
commences as such: “Turning and turning in the widening gyre/ The falcon cannot hear 
98 
 
the falconer; Things fall apart; the center cannot hold.”56  Indeed, some “revelation is at 
hand,” surely “the Second Coming” conjured by that “spiritus mundi,” or what we may 
substitute with Kant’s “mundus intelligibilis”; the instant when one “origin” (that sphinx) 
becomes centered otherwise, “slouches towards” a subsequent “origin” - “toward 
Bethlehem” and the birth of Jesus of Nazareth as the embodiment of promise, who like a 
promise between men, bore with his birth the emergence of the new and the salvation of 
the world from ruin.   
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3:2 The Shared Temporal Structure of Institutional Sequel and the nunc stans 
A certain minor light may still/ Lean incandescent/ Out of kitchen table or 
chair/ As if a celestial being took/ Possession of the most obtuse object now 
and then/ Thus hollowing an interval/ otherwise inconsequent/…miracles 
occur/ if you care to call those spasmodic/ tricks of radiance miracles… 
-Sylvia Plath, Black Rook in Rainy Weather
57
  
 
Having made commensurate flesh and inter esse, our accumulated reflections 
have suggested the need for a proper analytic comparison between the momentary 
temporal structure of the two at the emergence of the new in the present; between 
invisible flesh opening fields pregnant with the possibility of institutional sequel and the 
instances of miraculous newness sourced from an inter esse expanded within the 
metaphorical return of thought.  In this section it is our intention to first summarize the 
temporal structure of institutional sequel or institution in its “nascent state.” (IP 7)  
Compared to this will be an outlining of those pivotal instances of the eternal found in 
thinking, what Arendt borrows and modifies from Augustine as the nunc stans.  Having 
shown both as involved in absence/invisibility, first as a quasi-eternity through “an 
exchange of my times lived between the instants” and secondly as an eternity or gap 
between past and future, we will relate the two in their implications for the previously 
established divergent metaphor. (IP 7)  This hollowing out of the present is required to 
further our conviction that institutional sequel is a reformulation of natality in the 
Arendtian sense.   
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 In our chronological tracing of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, we employed the term 
field in an unspecified or unengendered way.  We did not designate a specific field, but 
were “guided by the idea that we can discern, in whatever field we consider, a singular 
mode of the structuring of events,” events, “while being wholly locatable ‘in’ 
time…show themselves to be constitutive of a time that is properly temporal.” (IP x)  
That is, despite a multiplicity of opened fields in relation to communal flesh, the 
institutional routes peripherally structuring the former and soliciting us towards the cast 
horizon all function in one common temporal structure.  This “properly temporal” points 
to the spatio-temporality constitutive of flesh, fields, and foremost perceptual experience.  
We recall it was the visible in differentiation upon the invisible whereby the latter 
(comprised of temporal symbolic matrices drawing inner and outer horizons to the field 
in a chiaroscuro character), offered unconscious solicitations of institutions that open 
before the world.  Over against this, thought introduced the historical adventure of 
consciousness indicative of institutional dis-continuance.  It was between these two that 
we understood institutional events as the reoperation of the institution whereby the time 
that is can “present the index of an interiority of time.” (IP x)     
It would appear that outlining the moment of institutional sequel with time itself - 
“[t]ime [as] the very model of institution [that which is and demands to be; it has to 
become what it is]” - leads us into a paradox.  It is unclear how time is composed of an 
amalgamation of its existentia and temporal fragments if those parts are interchangeable 
and do not already bear within them the whole.  But recall Merleau-Ponty’s comments 
concerning the encompassing example of Nautre: “Just as our intuition is an ek-stasis, by 
which we try to situate ourselves in the absolute, so too must the Absolute leave itself and 
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make itself into the World.” (NA 47)    Having demonstrated our being both inside and 
outside ourselves, both situating ourselves in the absolute and the Absolute making itself 
into our world,  we find “two symbolic systems in which each makes sense of the 
other…connected not through commitment in the event, but through echoes, exchanges, 
symbolic accumulations.” (IP 15)  Comprehension of institutional events in all their 
temporal interiority lies only in the inter-reference of the time that is to its temporal parts, 
in their implicit symbolic concordance understood in the convergent and contingent 
instant that is lived; “…the red is what it is only by connecting up from its place with 
other reds about it, with which it forms a constellation…[a] punctuation in the field of red 
things…”, and this constellation from flesh is glimpsed in those institutional moments of 
over-determination making such an interiority clear.     
In place of a metaphysical privileging or predominance of either whole or parts 
we concede in everyday perception the “whole in the parts” insofar as parts are a lateral 
passageway recoiling/receding towards the invisible whole dragged from behind - a 
project never satisfied but not without its contingent and referential flesh.  Hence, in the 
differentiated perceptual there is “immediate non-presence, but perspective understood as 
opening it’s beyond, leading to it by its very thickness, [which presupposes relief, 
obstacles, configuration].” (IP 6)  This involves a “non-decisionary project, not chosen, 
[an] intention without subject: living.  The project [implies the] existence of norms or 
levels…upright objects or not, paths” and it is this project we attribute to the unconscious 
anonymity of ever thickened flesh left unfinished in it navigated routes. (IP 6)  Because 
this project endlessly attempts to address itself by turning back into its own invisibility 
upon which it is differentiated, Merleau-Ponty claims: “…freedom and truth are 
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[indissoluble].  The freedom of pure negativity is a signification”, that is not nothing but 
is indeed meaningful. (IP 15)  There is “truly openness and truth as a mystery.”58 (IP 15) 
These institutional contingencies of the field as “ensemble of my body’s routes” 
that lead beyond by recoiling back in upright visible verticality clarify much about the 
temporal structure of institution. (VI 189)  Time is not an objective envelopment that 
flows up from behind; we are not wholly consumed.  Likewise time is not the inverse, 
enveloped by my fallacious non-being; “an idealist reversal as the consciousness of time, 
a movement of negation of the past, pure in itself, in the name of a future which, itself, is 
not.” (IP 7)  Rather, “[t]he past is not a ‘real’ fragment to be added to the present – 
Nacheinander der Jetztpunkte…There must be a presence of the past which is absence; it 
is necessary that it be a certain absence.” (IP 193)  There is a “[l]ateral kinship of all the 
‘nows’” which thought in objective differentiation from the “unthought-of” never 
transcends in its attempt to scan and parse amongst the times it is. (Signs 160)  Time, the 
past and present as Ineinander and navigated in the instances between, make traversable 
this temporal chiasmatic relationships: “…from me to the past [is] a thickness which is 
not made of a series of perspectives or of the consciousness of their relations…” (IP 7)  
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Time then, “…is total because it is partial, it is a field.  One can speak of a quasi-eternity 
not by the escaping of instants towards the non-being of the future, but by the exchange 
of my times lived between the instants.” (IP 7)   
This “quasi-eternity” as instances lived between temporal exchanges (and as 
indicative of our capacity to move towards a horizon in its partial-totality) is “…the 
originary trans-temporality…neither decline and decadence nor moreover the presence of 
the future in the present (Permanent Revolution), but it is institution in the nascent state.” 
(IP 7)  The “nascent moment” is the lived instant opened in transaction, the 
aforementioned “advent of an opening” wherein nature in its accumulation becomes 
vision and the “human beings must also become Nature” - a convergence and 
interlocking of dormant symbolic matrices through behavior or thought. (NA 47)  The 
present is one’s spatio-temporal transitivity before the totality of the crystallized world 
and one’s very displacement through this crystallized outcome is the result of this 
transitivity through symbolic convergence.  It is in the life lived between these instances 
that we can locate our pause to think, when thinking compressed over against this 
symbolic convergence becomes a Stiftung or institution in its very sequel.         
 This pause to think was indicative of institution as the “possibility of a common 
adventure and of a history of consciousness” from a “symbolic matrix that results in the 
openness of [this] field, of a future according to certain dimensions.” (IP 13)  Our 
institutional adventure then begins from an unconscious symbolic matrix, a “non-
figurative inner framework” or an invisible unconscious “constellation wherein our future 
is read,” pushed up into the time that is now. (VI 180)  The present perceptual 
punctuation of an object residing over a field connects up from its place with other 
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fragmentary phenomena about it “with which it forms a constellation...” (VI 132)  It is by 
virtue of a compression within these unconscious connections that such constellations 
operate in the manner of “symbolic” or “existential matrices.”  Through them, the time 
that is in its very constellation is activated or run through such that the output 
reconfigures the very coordinated constellation by means of its perceptual outcome, 
“[conforming] to an internal logic of which no clear view can be attained, because the 
course of events depends on the joint action of fragmentary phenomena.” (SMIM 114)  
Impossible to predict, these appearing events are recognized in a latency to their having 
been suffered, revealing that which was. 
Such reconfigurations within perception indeed solicited a pause for thought: 
“[w]hat defines human institution? A past which creates a question, puts it in reserve, 
makes a situation that is indefinitely open.” (IP 22)  And insofar as thought or reflection 
as taking this question up was demonstrated to be not over against the unreflected but 
over against reconfiguring reflection of both body and institutionally established thought, 
the present was outlined by yet another definition of institution according to our common 
adventure: “Human institution: [it is] chained integration, a whirlwind where everything 
converges, where everything succeeds; the Deckung of an anticipation and of a regression 
and the founding of a true now that is full.” (IP 22)  We have “past-future relation: 
symbolic matrix” as the intersection of what is between tenses, but not tangible in itself – 
indeed a gap in the aforementioned exchange.  (IP 20)   
It is an intersection hollowed out in transaction where we can live thoughtfully in-
between to reconfigure what was.  It is a gap from this enfolding movement in time, 
enveloping-enveloped, not merely horizontal head long into the future, but also 
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encountering “existence of norms or levels…[and] upright objects” as verticality, 
perception, and thoughtful consideration. (IP 6)  Thus, the very combination or 
perpendicular intersection of perception (reconfigured in its temporal constellation) and 
thought (bearing its own institutional constellation), yields the present not as in-itself but 
as a kind of zwischen; given yet with vision diffracted into multiple places of reflection 
like multiple eyes looking back from a diamond.  These complex intersections of the 
“exchanges of my times lived between the instants” are indeed a “quasi-eternity” in 
continual reorientation towards a demand of a future. (IP 7)    
Listen now to Arendt: “Eternity is in the now.” (LM 204)  To understand the 
implications of this statement we must specify within Arendt two sense of time; “time 
understood as spontaneity, as natality in which a new beginning is made possible today” 
as over against “the very nature of time itself, understood as the past and the future that 
make possible the present.”59  It is the first of these our reflections have aligned with 
action in its natal links and with the appearance of physis which, according to Antonio 
Calcagno, “marks a new promise.”60 The latter we have located in the inter esse, drawn 
within the noēsis noēseōs which “condition the very existence of the human being.”61  
The first is a time of natality which marking “a new promise” corresponds “exactly to the 
existence of a freedom which was given under the condition of non-sovereignty.” (HC 
244) The second notion of time between past and future makes possible the appearance of 
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the former as well as its signaled return. Finally, it is the latter as aligned with the 
thinking activity that reveals time in its deep temporal structure.  It is the experience of 
the thinking ego, limited in its visibility by its only adequate metaphor as the sensation of 
being alive, which leads Arendt to borrow and modify an eternity of now from the nunc 
stans of St. Augustine.  
 Originally conceived, the nunc stans (or “standing now”) of St. Augustine was 
“the eternity of the mind of God or the eternal omnipresence of God” touched upon by 
humanity “only when the arrow infinite future possibility of anticipations meets with the 
infinite trajectory of the past as uncovered in memory.”62 For St. Augustine, this eternity 
was a posthumous promise, likely derived from the “incomparable swiftness” indicative 
of the experience of thinking ego itself. (LM 45)  This is because, for St. Augustine, it 
was the experience of the memorial past contained within the present which was proof of, 
and drew the limitations to, the afterlife for man.  Those who had passed would not attain 
the full eternity of timeless omnipresence God but would be limited as to their inclusion 
to the fully eternal by a continued bearing of their once lived finitude.  Upon death, one 
“will experience eternity as promised by God” but only by continuing “to bear the 
finitude of their being…[and] therefore incapable of experiencing eternity in the way an 
infinite, omniscient, and omnipotent God does.”63 
 But it is not without coincidence that Plato, who considered contemplation of the 
remembered eternal Forms (anamnesis) a “pursuing death”, that it was between past and 
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future where St. Augustine contemplating the nature of memory touched upon the 
eternity of the afterlife, and finally that Arendt in a reduction of St. Augustine’s 
transcendental outlook observes: “The gap between past and future opens only in 
reflection, whose subject matter is what is absent – ether what has already disappeared or 
what has not yet appeared. (LM 79/206)  Like reaching into and carrying that which came 
before the birth of the now and the eternity promised posthumously, “reflection draws 
these absent ‘regions’ into the mind’s presence.” (LM 206)  In the reflective withdrawal 
of thought we locate a combination of the eternal or infinite over against the sensorial 
finitude of living experience, metaphorical for the experience of the thinking ego itself:  
In other words, the location of the thinking ego in time would be the in-
between of past and future, the present, this mysterious and slippery now, a 
mere gap in time, toward which nevertheless the more solid tenses of past and 
future are directed insofar as they denote which is no more and that which is 
not yet. (LM 208) 
“Man lives in this in-between” called the present or eternal “now” which although 
hollowing a gap in time, never leaves the living world; the past as “no more” and the 
future as “not yet” “is not historical datum; it seems to be coeval with the existence of 
man on earth.” (LM 210)  In thought, the present “arises with and through the clash of the 
past and the future; it is an antagonistic struggle” opening an eternal gap that “occurs as a 
particular experience of the present, as a place where one is no longer conscious of 
time.”64  Not eternity as a conceived boundary deemed unthinkable, this timelessness is 
truly unthinkable because “it indicates the collapse of all temporal dimensions…[The] 
nunc stans…gathers the absent tenses, the not-yet and not-more, together into its own 
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presence.” (LM 212)  Thus, the present as an appearing presence is differentiated upon 
that which does not appear, the forever absent and invisible thinking activity and its 
gathered tenses that are not out of time but contingent on their very temporality. 
Hence, Arendt’s present as appearing is aligned with those natal “miracles” that 
bring forward that which is absent in its eternal invisible gap. As the possibility of the 
natal and mortal threshold (indistinguishable at their very limits), this present harkens to 
our aforementioned important point of return where the liminal concepts of life and death 
(defined only in their opposition) were outlined as where we would locate sequel (an 
over-determined instant of exposed invisible contingencies as the temporal index to the 
time that is), qualified action (the convergence of energeia and entelecheia beaming forth 
from a background of convention in meaningful presence at an instance of physis and as 
the birth of the new), and our insertion into nature as a natal miracle.   
The convergence of these liminal concepts is precisely the divergent point of that 
aforementioned tangent to a circle which nevertheless draws the entire centripetal 
orbiting of being conditioned along with it.  A place of continual motion, the opened gap 
as an eternity between tenses is “everlasting change.” (LM 208)  It is because this 
structure is not transcendental to time and yet not stationary within it, that “[t]he present 
is described as a ‘diagonal’ that intersects or transverses the past and the future”; a 
diagonal trajectory of divergence in the eternal gap pivotally decentering the 
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aforementioned Arendtian times of natal spontaneity over against the deep structure of 
time itself.
65
     
Our earlier reflections have located this birthed divergence at the opening of 
physis, nature as the normally invisible made visible and as the totality of all thing 
through which the new makes its appearance as distinguished from the old upon which it 
is sourced.  Our reflections expanded this divergence of the new within the metaphorical 
return of thought, appearing from a withdrawn timelessness reminding us that the visible 
and invisible are “’made’ for each other.” (LM 109)  And insofar as the nunc stans 
demonstrates this intimate relationship between the visible and invisible, we also 
acknowledge it as the place of transitivity towards displacement in-between all the 
intersections we have laid out above; our spectacular intersection with nature in its 
eternal cycle, of the visible tangent to an orbiting invisible contingency as our nature, and 
Merleau-Ponty’s suggested lived instances between an exchange of times in quasi-
eternity.   
  Finally, this present gap is whereby a linear continuity of the past is lost: “What 
you then are left with is still the past, but a fragmented past, which has lost its certainty of 
evaluation.”  (LM 212)  As a metaphorical distancing from its primarily sensorial source, 
the tangent to a circle can never be an exact cyclical repetition or re-presentation but 
recoils in its present departure to return bearing the gifts of its newly accumulated 
temporal contingency in re-contextualization: it is “the infinity of possible meanings” 
precisely because of this non-linear fragmentation and “exchanges of my times lived 
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between the instants” such that “the identification between them [is] the interference and 
static of the relations of filiation.” 66  (IP 7)  This is why Calcagno reminds us that 
“[t]hinking makes visible that which is invisible; reflection and imagination allow de-
sensed and de-materialized things to appear. But time lets what appears in thought…have 
movement; time places them into various relations.”67  It is equally why institution as 
departing from while returning into of the absence of flesh is, described in a different 
context, “discontinuous, since each layer is made from forgetting the preceding one.  It is 
continuous from one end to the other because this forgetting is not simply absence.” 
(Signs 176)  Proceeding by its internal sense which “induces the external sense…it is 
open, because it is divergence in relation to a norm of sense, difference”, displacement, or 
fragmentation. (IP 11) 
 Here we equate the temporal structures of our two thinkers by recalling that it was 
the power of reflection to open and scan a field within flesh, to seek within its anonymous 
and unconscious invisibility a metaphor as the possibility of traversal within the opened 
field, spatial or otherwise.  Comparable to Arendt’s timeless gap opened by reflection is a 
“past-future relation: symbolic matrix” as the hollowed intersection of what is exchanged 
between tenses and made good by “[a] sort of existential eternity by means of self-
interpretation” that the very “standing now” provides.’  (IP 49)  It is then that, over 
layered with thought, the institutional moment possibly pivots to become “centered 
otherwise” - a decentering indicative of that “tangent to a circle” or diverging “diagonal 
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trajectory” provided by mnemonic re-appearance from the otherwise invisible source of 
the life of the mind.  Indeed, this makes not only the timeless eternal gap of the nunc 
stans commensurate with Merleau-Ponty’s hollowed out and lived instants between the 
“exchange of my times”, but allows us to further link Arendt’s “[e]ternity is in the now” 
with Merleau-Ponty’s “quasi-eternity” wherein “[t]time is the model of 
institution…neither decadence…nor anticipation…but it is on time, the time that it is.” 
(IP 7/LM 204)   
We now understand this “standing now” is not so much epistemological 
confirmation as much as it is continued epistemological creation in its very divergence 
towards the future which never fails to include its contingencies, like a work of art or a 
book; “…a series of institutions” proceeding by its internal sense which “induces the 
external sense because it is open, because it is divergence in relation to a norm of 
sense...” (IP 11) 
With these temporal structures compared we conclude with the following: 
institutional sequel is the displaced and returned point of an asymmetrical repetition 
ultimately outlined by metaphor, provided for by that divergent gap or absence in the 
present and understood as caused by the compressed activity of the thinking ego.  Indeed, 
metaphor, the only product of the sheer activity of the thinking ego whose only adequate 
exemplification is the sensation of life itself, moves on a tangent of accumulation 
simultaneously forward towards the demand of the future and back into the very 
thickness of flesh or the inter esse that is between persons.  It is the movement of return 
to ourselves “of ‘re-entering ourselves,’ St. Augustine said – is as if rent by an inverse 
movement which it elicits.” (Signs 161) 
112 
 
3:3 Making our Way to Birth 
“No single event can awaken in us a stranger totally unknown to us.  To live 
is to slowly be born.” 
-Antoine de Saint-Expuéry, Flight to Arras
68
 
 Making our way to birth, we now will take up our prior convergences and 
reflections to address the mechanisms of divergence or decentering indicative of the 
present in its established absence, indicating the Nachvollzug or reoperation of an 
institution in sequel, a moment of miraculous appearance metaphorical or otherwise, and 
finally the birth of being. An exploration of this mechanism leads us to see that birth, by 
way of the couple that conceives, satisfies the preconditions for action merging energeia 
and entelecheia to reveal physis while simultaneously centering otherwise the institution 
into which the borne is inaugurated.  In alignment with our thesis, birth will be shown to 
be an “institution of a future” and institutional in its very sequel as a re-birth. (IP 8) 
Finally, we will conclude our project by returning to our abandoned natal analogy left at 
the end of our first chapter in the example Goethe in Rome.    
 Our second chapter outlined the appearance of physis as the birth of being through 
an action performed.  Like that mortal trajectory of human affairs moving from birth to 
death and thwarted by action’s spectacular appearance in an intersection with nature’s 
cyclical rule, we had the opportunity  in a structural comparison to distinguish the 
rectilinear motion of mere cognition from the thinking ego’s cyclical quest for meaning: 
“Aristotle’s circular motion (noēsis noēseōs), taken together with the life metaphor 
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suggests a quest for meaning that for man as a thinking being accompanies life and ends 
only in death” turning in circles as long as man is alive. (LM 124)  Insofar as meaning 
was provided by thought in its mnemonic return within the present, we can consider the 
previously established tangential and diagonal divergence of this quest: 
…man, who himself has an ‘origin’, his birth and his death, and therefore 
stands at any given moment between them; this in-between is called the 
present…which we can conceive of cyclically as well as in the form of 
rectilinear motion without ever being able to conceive of an absolute 
beginning or absolute end – into time as we know it. (LM 203) 
   Comparable to the instant of appearing physis, continuing and coincidental within 
this divergent timeless gap, the thinking activity does not terminate in an accomplishment 
of meaning: “If thinking is an activity…[such that] the only adequate metaphor for it…is 
the sensation of being alive, then…all questions concerning the aim or purpose of 
thinking are as unanswerable as questions about the aim or purpose of life.” (LM 197)  
Thought may provide meaning for a quest its activity has opened, but it will never satisfy 
the chiasm it has opened within itself which it can never fully outrun.  Thus, Arendt 
asserts that in this gap between past and future: “…we find our place in time when we 
think”, that “we are sufficiently removed from past and future to be relied on to find out 
their meaning…never arriving at a final solution to their riddles but ready with ever-new 
answers to the question of what it may be all about.” (LM 209)   
 Questions kept in reserve are equally important to the dis-continuity of institution.  
We had seen that the recessional temporal index of our unconscious synergetic body 
continually inserted itself into its very flesh such that opened “routes” within this 
temporal non-figurative framework of significatory constellations could function as 
symbolic matrices to reconfigure the framework through its perceptual outcome.  The 
114 
 
activation of the invisible constellations as the time that is in its internal temporal 
differentiation meant that the matrix resulted in “...ruptures in equilibrium, or 
reorganizations [that] conform to an internal logic of which no clear view can be attained, 
because the course of events depends on the joint action of fragmentary phenomena.” 
(SMIM 114)  Hence, perception understood as differentiation on this “non-figurative 
framework” created “cohesion without concept” - associations between “rays” of time 
and world becoming over-determined in their very Rückgestaltung “through which the 
truth of this ray of Being or emergent Gestalt can be referred back to its origins in the 
previous and still not structured elements…[to] bring about an invocation and search for 
an answer.” (W 122 italics mine) 
 Thus, like the never ending puzzles provided by the thinking ego, a puzzling 
question concerning the unconscious “non-figurative framework” arises through its 
reconfiguring convergence as the displaced outcome of visibility, appearance, and 
perception.  Institutionally, it is this question or enigma of an origin continually kept in 
reserve, opened in search for an answer that can decenter the institution’s simple structure 
and open it up to interrogation.  Thus, “Human institution always resumes a prior 
institution, which has posed a question…a past which creates a question, puts it in 
reserve…which was its anticipation – and which has failed.”  (IP 22)  Recommencing, 
“[i]t reactivates this problem and human institution reunites its given in a totality that is 
centered otherwise…” such that the institution’s truth in divergence “lies in restructuring 
which, from one end to the other, is known to itself, and is in agreement with itself.” (IP 
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22)  This reorganizing is “according to a new sense that is nevertheless the same sense of 
this same structure”, accounting for difference without failing to carry its contingencies.69 
 With this forever unsolvable question of origins, this enigma in reserve, we find 
the mechanism of divergence or decentering indicative of the present in its absence and 
newness à la Husserl: “since inquiry is, as he said, a continuous beginning.” (Signs 161)   
Like Arendt’s failure and subsequent resumption of a final solution to the riddle of what 
life is all about, the meaning of an institution in its reoperation is subject to similar re-
questioning.  Hence, we may link an institution’s becoming “centered otherwise” (as the 
present’s pivoting displacement upon its non-figurative framework) as synonymous with 
the aforementioned “tangent to a circle” provided for by the metaphorical re-appearance 
from and otherwise invisible source in both the case of revealed physis and spontaneous 
return within the thinking activity.  The latter’s metaphorical quality accounts for 
difference or newness made good on by “a sort of existential eternity by means of self-
interpretation” that the very “standing now” provides. (IP 49)  Hence, the   “standing 
now” is not so much epistemological confirmation as much as it is continued 
epistemological creation in its very divergence towards the future which never fails to 
include its contingencies; “…a series of institutions” proceeding by its internal sense 
which “induces the external sense because it is open, because it is divergence in relation 
to a norm of sense, difference”, or displacement. (IP 11)     
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It is this question continually kept in reserve within an absence outlining the 
present in its compressed fullness that we find the quest for meaning bears the most 
meaningful fruit of all: the birth of being.  To properly address our desired connection 
between birth and institution, we now turn to an example of the lived present bearing this 
absence, a practical example used by both authors; the institutional development of a 
feeling between two in a relationship of love.   
Merleau-Ponty’s account of cathexis begins with his signature double negation: 
“Common idea of preordination, of a nature calling forth a feeling…the idea of a reality 
and growth of the feeling as if it were an organism” over against the conventional “no 
truth, nor falsity of the feeling.  As soon as it is felt it is true.  And it is never true as 
conformity to a nature or to a destiny.” (IP 28)  Like the intellectualist or empiricist 
account of language, the example of love presents another philosophic quandary wherein 
the agent’s relation to certain transcendentalism is bound in exclusive binary poles - 
subject to the transcendental or the transcendental as wholly isolated in transcendental 
subjectivity.  Yet reflection located in the eternity of the now or quasi-eternity of lived 
instants between times exchanged opens the possibility for communion through action:  
“It is created by oath, decision, i.e. promised behavior.  But we throw ourselves into it, 
i.e., we end up feeling, and not only acting, according to the promise.” (IP 28)  And as we 
can recall, promise was that very special performed action performed which according to 
Arendt arises “directly out of the will to live together with others in the mode of acting 
and speaking.” (HC 246) 
To continue with Merleau-Ponty, the project of this promise assumes desire in 
advance.  By virtue of the other’s body, perceptually transcending me with mine, the 
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desire is to achieve an assumed possibility of wholly possessing the other as suggested by 
the very fact that they are appear in the flesh.  It is because they “appear” in this 
suggested plenitude that the institution of a feeling between two begins in paradox, the 
“whole” suggested in the other’s appearing parts that preclude the possibility of their 
presupposed totality.  For this is what men are: “absolutely present beings who have a 
wake of the negative.  A perceiving body that I see is also a certain absence that is 
followed out and tactfully dealt with behind that body by its behaviour…[and these] 
‘negativities’ also count in the sensible world.” (Signs 172)  And yet “because of this 
[paradox], real.  It inaugurates a drama which is going to be real.”  (IP 30)    
The paradox then, begins with the paradoxical structure of desire itself.  Desire, 
structured exterior to itself, aimed at, and fulfilled in its being eclipsed is analogous with 
the structure of fabrication or cognition as seen in Arendt: “first perceiving the image or 
shape (eidos) of the product-to-be, and then organizing the means and starting the 
execution.” (HC 225)  Likewise Merleau-Ponty suggests that love “is created before 
anything else by imagining another being, mythological figure of cruelty” whereby desire 
over-determines the mythological illusion of a figure assumed fully visible and needing 
no differentiation upon an invisible backdrop. (IP 33)  This “reification” is simultaneous 
with the action of oath or promise that we inhabit in a crossing over into the other 
through its overarching reach.  For love opens its institution on this illusion initiated by 
the other’s very being in the wake of flesh: “This is the illusion, for they are all of that 
only insofar as non-possessed.  But the illusion is in the accomplishment, not in the 
project which is real by means of the fact that we truly become the other, that the other 
invades us.” (IP 30)  And it is precisely in this wake of the negative, in ek-stases testing 
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their commensurability by establishing their own common adventure that their very basic 
behavior becomes a consideration of the other insofar as they inhabit one another and 
find the other carried within themselves.    
In invisible wakes and accumulated commitments this on-going institution 
establishes its times and places in the compressed absence of its present as a point of 
continual reference, “a series of institutions” proceeding by its internal sense that 
“induces the external sense because it is open, because it is divergence in relation to a 
norm of sense...” (IP 11)  And because man is present with body and wake, the institution 
between two in its own certain and compounded absence is best understood in the image 
of a light bulb whose positive and negative filaments join to cause the very circuit behind 
which they disappear in blinding light, that which their co-reversing synergetic bodies 
perpetuate in continual insertion.  Indeed, like “the light that illuminates processes of 
action, and therefore all historical processes, [appearing] only at their end” the light 
caused by and provided for those instituted in their very movement, “…is never entirely 
in the present.” (HC 192/IP 52)  Hence, we return to the inhabiting of each other’s bodies 
in our extended flesh on through that illuminating promise co-made in oath.  The other is 
“not constituting-constituted, i.e. my negation, but instituted-instituting, [in relation to 
me, because I am, in relation to myself, institued-instituting]…[there is] true 
communication through lateral practicing.” (IP 6)  What is at issue is one “intersubjective 
or symbolic field, [the field] of cultural objects, which is our milieu, our hinge, our 
jointure – instead of the subject-object alternation.” (IP 6)  
The co-reversibility of shared anonymous bodies in promise, opening and 
unfolding through temporally thick flesh is precisely a departure into the certain freedom 
119 
 
this action grants.
70
  In the words of Arendt: “binding oneself through promises, serves to 
set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security 
without which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in 
the relationship between men.” (HC 237)  It is this promise in its initiated action and 
signaled return which open possible paths based on the contingencies indicative of the 
institution, the freedom of its possibilities bound by a web of relations that links promise 
(like any other action) to our tacit conditioning.   
Thus, institutionally, these very contingencies are found in the hollow of the 
presence of each other: “One does not love a person, one does not love a body, one loves 
a life established in a body.  [The] body [is] neither first nor second.  [The] mind neither 
second nor first.  The individual [is] the passage of a freedom.” (IP 30)  Hence, as like 
any other institution in its bound contingencies by which its certain freedom is possible, 
“…love, [intends a] sense as open sense, which develops by means of proliferation, by 
curves, decentering and recentering…a sort of identity between the whole and the parts, 
the beginning and the need.” (IP 48)  The other with body is a point of origin for 
institutional contingency as a “passage of a freedom” such that its “Einfühlung [is] an 
echo of my incarnation, and that a flash of meaning makes them [the other] substitutable 
in the absolute presence of origins.” (Signs 175)   
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In this way our body with its wake of the negative that allows us to maintain an 
“individuality” or relationship with ourselves within an in-between without our entire 
envelopment, to belong and to be at a distance as comparable to the appearance of physis.  
In the negative, like the body itself (“not elsewhere, but one cannot say that it is here or 
now”) we recognize love: “[d]ecidedly therefore, love is not [a] positive, it is…negative.  
And necessarily because it is the question of the essence of being loved (who was she?).” 
(VI 147/IP 36)   
This question, “who?” is precisely the mechanism for the institution of a feeling 
between two.  Through this question love can fail and be reactivated again, reconfigure 
while bearing its adventure, and is that enigma kept in reserve as impetus for institutional 
continuance.  Hence Levinas notes: “What is presented as the failure of communication 
in love in fact constitutes the positive character of the relationship; this absence of the 
other is precisely present qua other.”71  The failure of communication, that which begins 
the question of “who?” anew, bringing the action of promise into play, is the potential 
continuance of the question: “Like death, love is what reveals the ‘personality’…allows 
us to see everything someone is, how someone is the world itself, being itself, a being 
from which we are excluded.” (IP 37)  Hence, in the divergence of taking up an existing 
institution we can follow Ralón de Walton when she says:  
If the relationship with the other is as primordial as the relationship with our 
lived body, an analysis of perception in terms of articulation of the visible and 
the invisible must have its parallel in an analysis of empathy that also shows 
our being-for-others taking roots in the lived body along with a dimension of 
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concealment in regard to them.  In this case, the unconscious is the ‘the 
Urgemeinschaftung of our intentional life, the Ineinander of the other in us 
and of us in them. (SMIM 119) 
To segue to Arendt, we recall that it was also the disclosure of a “who” that was 
one of our outlined preconditions for qualified action in the Arendtian sense.  Unlike 
fabrication which occurs only in isolation beginning with a means-to-end structure, action 
as shining over against convention was necessarily aimed into plurality and bore with it 
the disclosure to this very question (“who?”), opening in its successes a kind of appearing 
physis as the totality of our lover’s mutual understanding form the normally invisible and 
as the totality of all things between them.     
We can further recall that it was the specific action of promise whereby the 
conditioning and action are continually coincidental in their own entelecheia.  It was 
promise, like the words of Homer that held in equilibrium an ethos in-between Greeks 
that could best master the “darkness of human affairs” – the “basic reliability of men who 
never can guarantee today who they will be tomorrow” and “the impossibility of 
remaining unique masters of what they do, of knowing its consequences and relying upon 
the future.” (HC 244)  This moral precept of promise as a recession between men is only 
so by virtue of the fact that promise, like all qualified actions, are made on the 
contingencies of and touch upon the inter esse of men. (HC 246)  Action as the birth of 
being suggests that this birth is of the inter esse and bears with it the structure of promise 
in its return, indicative of our coming to witness our having been conditioned by it at 
revealed physis.  Bearing the new in its departure and signaled return, promise provides 
us with a present birth in reference to what was in reconfigured latency, a re-appearance 
in reference to the promise’s having been made.  Promise then, is like thought:  “It is by 
122 
 
time that my thoughts are dated.  It is by time too that they make a date, open a future for 
thought – a cycle, a field.” (Signs 14)   
Listen now to Arendt who depicts love as sharing this field like quality: 
This world-creating faculty of love is not the same as fertility, upon which 
most creation myths are based.  The following mythological tale, on the 
contrary, draws its imagery clearly from the experience of love: the sky is 
seen as a gigantic goddess who still bends down upon the earth god, from 
whom she is being separated by the air god who was born between them and 
is now lifting her up.  Thus a world space composed of air comes into being 
and inserts itself between earth and sky. (HC 242) 
 Metaphorical for a field, the sky as a gigantic goddess “bends down upon the 
earth god,” mutually separating the two by a chiasm as the fleeting vanishing point of the 
visibility between them and where their offspring comes to be born; a world space 
composed of air.  Their love, like the field of institution sends them towards a fleeting 
intersection on the horizon, the no-longer as a not-yet from which will be sourced that 
which they return to the world.  In their movement, it is this spatio-temporal horizon (its 
beyond still presented in experience and peripherally structuring the spatio-temporal 
curvature of the given) that is subject to reconfiguration – fleeting, not in the sense of 
total disappearance but continually opening towards its continually recast limits as the 
threshold between the visible and invisible.   
That sky and earth in their communion are joined in their ever running, ever 
extended vanishing point is telling.  Never fully elucidated or a gap never fully fused, this 
chiasm sends our lovers endlessly running towards one another indirectly on an infinite 
curved plane, towards that “…house on the horizon [that] gleams solemnly, like thing 
past or hoped for” or like lovers’ idle hands tacitly reaching towards the end of day. 
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(Signs 15)  The institution of love self references the promise on which it is made like a 
muse, generating its own power or impotence through its own reconfiguration.  It is an 
unending source towards a continually born truth as the ever desired unfolding and 
deepening mystery of inhabiting each other. 
It is for this very reason why both author’s link the project of promise to the 
disclosure of a “who”, Merleau-Ponty telling us that “[l]ike death, love is what reveals 
the ‘personality’…allows us to see everything someone is, how someone is the world 
itself, being itself, a being from which we are excluded”, and Arendt tells us that love 
bears “an unequalled clarity of vision for the disclosure of ‘who’” as a “a type or 
‘character’ in the old meaning of the word” whose description results in the other’s 
uniqueness escaping us. (IP 37/HC 181)  Thus, when Arendt tells us “[t]he essence of 
who somebody can come into being only when life departs, leaving behind nothing but a 
story” and Merleau-Ponty refers to love as a “drama”, we can recall that a story is 
sourced from an action that shows us all the invisible in the midst of visibility at a 
distance to which we are both included and excluded in our following its example. (HC 
193/IP 30)   
Arendt’s failure to address the body in this instance of love aside, it is true that 
Arendt sees love as a detriment to the possibility of action in the political sense: “by 
reason of its passion, it [love] destroys the in-between which relates us to and separates 
us from others” conceived of as an isolated interiority, womb, or a place forever 
withdrawn from the public realm. (HC 242)  In a sense, she is very correct on this point.  
It is difficult to conclude with any certainty the nature of the fabric that holds a couple in 
union, hidden from us in its very withdrawal.  Yet despite this attempt to parse the inter-
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institutional as aligned with the public realm from the inter-personal as aligned with the 
private realm, Arendt seems deny the institutional characteristics that finds their way into 
and structure our private lives.  For insofar as love “possess an unequalled…clarity of 
vision for the disclosure of who” and insofar as love never occurs in isolation (always 
aimed into a conditioned web of contingencies in its very vibration), love continues to 
satisfy the two outlined preconditions for action which reveals physis as a totality of a 
having been conditioned (as synonymous with institutional sequel and its exposed 
temporal interiority).   
In other words, Arendt is correct to suggest that love is a withdrawal from the 
public realm as in agreement with Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion that “love is not [a] 
positive, it is…negative.” (IP 36)  Yet, Arendt tries to have it both ways, both reserving 
action for the political as away from the inter-personal while maintaining the 
preconditions for action within both.  This can best be seen when Arendt criticizes 
Aristotle for failing to recognize an action between two which is by no means political in 
nature.  Having distinguished what somebody is as aligned with fabrication, from who 
somebody is as revealed by action (“[t]he moment we want to say who somebody is, our 
very vocabulary  leads us astray into saying what he is; we get entangled in a description 
of qualities he necessarily shares with others like him.”) Arendt proceeds to chastise 
Aristotle for the very public (what) and private (“who”) distinction she tries to maintain. 
(HC 181)  Aristotle tells us that the relationship between a benefactor and his recipient 
should be regarded as a work: “that the benefactor always loves those he has helped more 
than he is loved by them,…that this is only natural, since the benefactor has done a work, 
an ergon, while the recipient has only endured his beneficence.” (HC 196)  The 
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benefactor “according to Aristotle, loves his ‘work,’ the life of the recipient he has 
‘made,’ as the poet loves his poems, and he reminds his reader that the poet’s love for his 
work is hardly less passionate than a mother’s love for her children.” (HC 196)  Thus, 
Arendt criticizes Aristotle for outlining acting in terms of fabrication, along with 
conceiving love as a self-serving solipsistic projection: “In this instance is it perfectly 
obvious how this interpretation…actually spoils the action itself and its true result, the 
relationship it should have established.” (HC 196)   
But even in this instance of action, the relationship between men established is not 
exclusive to the political and indeed is not void of the possibility a kind of love.  For if 
this is so it remains unclear why the criticism of Aristotle includes the example of mother 
raising her children as merely a type of fabrication.  Rather Arendt’s criticism of Aristotle 
for maintaining love as a solipsistic projection and action is a kind of  fabrication should 
be a clear indication that love cannot be excluded from that between men but can be a 
part of the in-between’s very fabric even if invisible to certain others, interpretable 
through their behavior towards one another. It is Arendt who reminds us that Socrates, 
who despite his proclaimed ignorance said, “this talent I have been given: I can easily 
recognize a lover and a beloved.” (LM 178)  It may be true that love has no place in the 
realm of political action, but an institution of love can be founded upon actions as that 
institution’s very signposts to which it returns.   
Finally, it would be the love for a child which would return our mother to the world 
along with the question of “who” the child may be.  For, this institutional question as a 
key component to the preconditions of action, equally sets in motion an upsurge within 
the inter esse allowing us to return to that offspring of analogized love between sky and 
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earth; the “air god” as a kind of element, invisible but not nothing that can make its 
appearance at the horizon’s edge:  
As long as…[love’s] spell lasts, the only in-between which can insert itself 
between two lovers is the child, love’s own product.  The child, this in-
between to which the lovers now are related and which they hold in common, 
is representative of the world in that it also separates them; it is an indication 
that they will insert a new world into the existing world.  Through the child, it 
is as though the lovers return to the world from which their love had expelled 
them.  But this new worldliness, the possible result and the only possibly 
happy ending of a love affair, is, in a sense, the end of love, which must either 
overcome the partners anew or be transformed into another mode of 
belonging together. (HC 242)  
 It is out of the absence between lovers, on the horizon and vanishing threshold 
between them that the child comes through a couple’s enfolded negation of ek-stasis in 
being born.  With the combination of mythological representation and the above quote we 
are able to suggest that like love, birth in all its passivity is indeed one’s initial action that 
opens the normally invisible in the midst of visibility by satisfying the two “uncertain 
certainties” as action’s very preconditions.  First, unlike fabrication in its means-to-ends 
structure which can occur in solitary isolation, action necessarily comes out of and is 
aimed back at plurality.  The borne child is not what we indicate when we speak about 
the “reproductive process” outlined as a kind of fabrication process attributed to biology. 
The child is born to a people or a mother at least.  Secondly and already explored at 
length: “Action…the human activity most associated with natality…must at the same 
time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: ‘Who are you?’” (HC 
178)  Birth as the arrival of a newcomer from parental flesh introduces this question by 
revealing, centering otherwise, and perpetuating an institutional found in-between all 
potentially involved actors. 
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For those institutionalized actors, the birth of a child as an action signals “the end 
of love”, or the promise in signaled return, “which must either overcome the partners 
anew or be transformed into another mode of belonging together.” (HC 242)  That is, as a 
type of action bringing the new into the world, birth reveals physis and simultaneously 
decenters the institutional inter esse of those lover’s, makes that between them “centered 
otherwise” in a divergence of their institution simultaneous with the divergent arrival of 
the new.  Birth signals the moment of institutional sequel whereby the retrograde 
movement of the true through which the borne emerges becomes over-determined, 
revealing a recessional index that harkens to our origins along with the child’s, or makes 
physis appear indicating nature’s being overcome in this very return to it.   
To continue with this thought, it was an explored wonder caused by the 
appearance of physis as the birth of being witnessed through the paradoxical totality of all 
things in simultaneity: “the wonder that befalls the philosopher can never concern 
anything particular but is always aroused by the whole, which…is never manifest.” (LM 
143) It is this wonder of the whole of being that is best indicated by the experience of 
thaumazein. Indeed, Plato, speaking through Socrates, tells us “’I think he [namely 
Hesiod] was not a bad genealogist who made Iris [the rainbow, a messenger of the gods] 
the daughter of Thaumas [the wonderer].’” (LM 142)  “At first glance” Arendt continues, 
this makes it seems as though “[wonder] springs from marveling at the miracles of the 
sky.  As the rainbow connecting the sky with the earth god brings its message to men, so 
thinking…responding in wonder to the daughter of the Wonderer, connects the earth with 
the sky.” (LM 142) Thus we have an established connection in that place where this 
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rainbow as birth’s meaningful message is coincidental with the junction of sky goddess 
and earth god, in that absent intersection where their offspring is born.   
To be sure, at this emergence from an intersection and in the experience of 
thaumazein the whole is “never manifest” in this message.  The totality of the non-
figurative framework revealed in institutional sequel, just as the totality of our being 
conditioned revealed at physis, can never be made fully explicit: “It seems possible to use 
it [the word thaumazein] in opposite senses at once; thaumazein both opens our eyes wide 
and plunges us into the dark.”
72
  Rather than an explicit totality, received “is the beauty 
of the game of the world, the meaning and meaningfulness of all the particulars acting 
together…manifest only to a beholder in whose mind the particular instances and 
sequences are invisibly united.” (LM 144)   
This meaningful message that connects heaven and earth within the absence of the 
now through which their offspring is born to reveal all that was, the beauty of the 
meaning and meaningfulness of all the particulars acting together as the particular 
instances of united invisibles, is clearly analogous with the re-birth we have aligned with 
institutional sequel - a glimpse at flesh through a harmony of particular times as the time 
that is: “the oldest let themselves be identified only because they have turned out to have 
been generators of the ones that came next, and the most recent allow themselves to be 
identified only because…they bear the trace of their gestation in the past.” (IP x)  Those 
charged moments of institutional sequel whereby the past and present are Ineinander, are 
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thus, not unlike that experience meaningful message where “particular instances and 
sequences are invisibly united” (a “recognition of the particularities which unite” in the 
words of Merleau-Ponty). (LM 144)   
Indeed, “of this physis, Heraclitus said that ‘it like to hide itself,’ namely behind 
the appearances”, the latter appearance aligned with the spectacular quality of the new 
itself.  Insofar as the totality of our having been conditioned can never be made fully 
explicit and our origin as our birth always remains a non-event or fundamental absence in 
our life, we advance the claim that institutional threads woven through time harkens to an 
always concealed zero degree from which we are born, an instant never explicit in-itself 
but nonetheless, emerging from the combined ek-stases of others, is contingent for all 
other instances and institutional sequels in our lives.  In the instance of re-birth, these 
united particularities are understood as involving the times instituting of our birth; 
passing from others through their recessional temporal index into or through a recessional 
temporal index that is for us the passage into time itself. (LM 144/IP 64)        
We had said that it was the from the view point of nature in its cyclical movement 
that our life spanning from birth to death seemed like a deviation from this common rule 
and eternal return.  It followed that, human affairs, if passively accepted, found 
themselves on a trajectory of ruin.  This doomed trajectory was thwarted by action.  It 
was action’s natal beginnings as initiated upsurge of the inter esse that shares in and is 
our “acting in” point of intersection with the automatic cyclical processes – “a miracle” 
called physis on the background of our mortal trajectory.  From our original physis, 
nature was expanded into contemplated Being, and Being, as our being conditioned, was 
that which had been shown to be between us.  Thus, the endless and invisible circular 
130 
 
motion of thought (noēsis noēseōs), dealing in absences made present and never 
abandoning nature’s spectacular eternal return, appears from nowhere and equally must 
“look like a miracle.”   
It was metaphor provided by the thinking ego’s re-turn that was a “tangent to a 
circle”, a divergence steered through the interplay of orbiting contingencies.  This tangent 
was shown to be an opened diagonal trajectory in the timeless eternity of the now or 
instances lived between an exchange of times (the no-longer and the not-yet) in quasi-
eternity.  In this sense, the present itself in its very absence or gap, where both perception 
(differentiated on its unconscious temporal contingencies), and thought (never a 
departure from the times that it is), is the birth of being or re-birth of an institution in 
sequel.   
Finally, we had suggested that it is out of that very same absence between lovers, 
the vanishing threshold between them in ek-stasis, that the child comes through in being 
born.  The child, born through these enfolding ek-stases into the institutions they entail 
and as part of the promise of natal newness, meaning, and accumulating contingencies, 
makes the child appear in the present like physis; a coming through those complex 
temporal arrangements from the negative wake from which the born emerges as a 
metaphor of what the lover’s return to the world.  Birth as an action is a kin to promise, 
leaving exposed all that the child will come through (understood or not only in latency) 
and returned to the world metaphorically anew.  Appearing from the gap on the horizon 
comprised of all the temporal contingencies to which the child will be exposed, the child 
is a living metaphor of the institutions that will solicit him into a world and into/by which 
he or she will act.   
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To understand this we can recall our reflections on nature and listen to 
Kierkegaard exploring the image of a mother embracing her child: “It is a picture that 
must be called the lovelies that human life has to display; it is a nature myth, which 
therefore may be seen only in artistic portrayal.”73  This is a “nature myth” because it is 
that nature lived between parent and child, opened from the inside and tangible only in its 
metaphorical manifestations - gestures and actions which echo beyond their conventional 
and functional meaning.  Hence, “the visible institution is only the support of a spirit of 
the institution, certainly not immutable (love changes constantly, like a separation), but 
whose very change is a reaction of the event upon the instituted.” (IP 10)  And indeed, for 
Merleau-Ponty, an “artistic portrayal” follows a “blind logic, logic which creates on the 
way.” (IP 41)  The institution of artistic portrayal, “of an [artistic] work, like the 
institution of love, [intends a] sense as open sense, which develops by means of 
proliferation, by curves, decentering and recentering…ambiguous passage, with a sort of 
identity between the whole and the parts, the beginning and the end…” (IP 49)  Like the 
thinking ego whose only adequate metaphor is the sensation of being alive, the charged 
advent of the birth of a child is metaphorical expression for the whole of life itself, of all 
the re-births that we experience in the institutions that make up the world and ourselves 
through this invisible origin carried through with us for all time.     
Existentially speaking, the paradoxical quality of birth is that it is both ours and 
yet never an event in our lives. Arendt reminds us that “[w]e do not live our death.” (LM 
49)  The same can be said about our birth as the original unappropriable absence that 
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institutes and initiates the engenderment of our continued present in its eternal hollowed 
quality upon sublimated and assimilated temporal contingencies.  With us at every 
moment, reconfigured and aimed anew in those institutional sequels which fissure the 
time that it is, these experienced “re-births” show us as outside of ourselves in an 
established temporal equilibrium between those preceding others, their institutions, and 
the actions and thoughts we perform in the now.   
Birth then is truly present by paradoxically staying forever absent in the fullness 
of the now, and hence our quoting of Kierkegaard and his “nature myth.”  It is 
foundational for the gap of the present, a slippery now in a cycle come to term, continued 
in the metaphorical return of our birth in our own life, opened again in a reorienting 
divergence that delivers us the “new.”  And insofar as the re-turned metaphor from the 
life of the mind reminded us that the visible and invisible were made for each other, the 
active-passivity of birth links up with the revealed physis in that question answered only 
by turning to those to whom, with their own ek-stases, we are born to: who are you?  
 It was this question kept in reserve as the institutional essence of being loved that 
allowed an institution to continue on its very contingencies.  And in this sense, those 
contingencies of those to whom we are born, find themselves in our infancy in the 
fulfilling of our dependencies.  We had said that passing from others in their recessional 
temporal index was a passing into or through a recessional temporal index that is for us 
the passage into time itself.  Here we expand: we pass from a body in the flesh only into 
more bodies in the flesh because institution precedes us in preparation for us, co-
instituted by others who in their Fürsorge are a passage to a certain freedom.  Those lives 
of others become shared by the solicitation in an ek-stasis which frees us by the 
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extending of our flesh into their flesh.  Hence, the movement of life is always the 
enfolding in and through others as a “passage of freedom” and as an awakening of the 
inter esse as the dynamic possibility between us, where we come to be imbued with 
others whose words and deeds return to us in thought and consideration.  As we move on 
a trajectory of life, we become imbued with each other, are thickened in body and 
thought by the institutions we co-institute together that can reveal each other as a “who” 
in storied form.  Indeed, traveling through this extended flesh which we open between us, 
we understand Saint-Expuéry when he says: “No single event can awaken in us a stranger 
totally unknown to us.  To live is to slowly be born.”    
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Conclusion 
Despite different departures and aims, we have shown that Merleau-Ponty and 
Hannah Arendt can be read as sharing a deep concern for the roles of visibility and 
invisibility, appearing and non-appearing, in their respective philosophies towards a 
mutual co-supplementation in a genuine account of birth.  More specifically, we have 
demonstrated birth as institutional, outlined by the continuation of a historically 
contingent sensibility insofar as its event exposes the actors and child to an interiority of 
time.  Inversely, we have demonstrated an institutional sequel as a kind of re-birth, 
synonymous with Arendtian action that granted a glimpse at physis as the birth of being – 
nature, understood as the normally invisible in the midst of the visibility and as the 
totality of all things, appearing as a kind of natal “miracle.”     
This was shown by drawing on a homology  between Merleau-Pontyan flesh and 
the Arendtian inter esse, demonstrating that both concepts bespoke of a fruitful 
dialectical relationship between invisibility and visibility wherein the new is born, 
coming to appear through our conditioned nature as the visible in its intimate relationship 
to the temporal characteristic of the invisible. 
Nature as our having been conditioned was shown to be lodged in the dynamic of 
making visible.  A conditioned nature was this dynamic’s visible outcome and that 
conditioning exposed by action’s revealing of physis (analogous with an exposed 
interiority in the instance of institutional sequel).  Physis as the birth of being and an 
early word for nature was that spectacular intersection between action and nature’s 
eternal cyclical rule that saved human affairs by exposing our being conditioned as the 
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invisible in the midst of visibility and as the totality of all things.  Likewise, Merleau-
Ponty’s flesh and institution respectively demonstrated the visible as differentiated upon 
invisibility in an institution of nature and, as analogous with the revealing of physis, the 
exposure of this invisibility as a temporal index to the instant in the case of institutional 
sequel.  It was by the latter of these, institutional sequel, that we were able to introduce 
the importance of the thinking activity as already over against our being conditioned such 
that we were able to expand physis as the birth of being within the noēsis noēseōs of 
thought - a birth of being through metaphor in its very divergence.  
Important for our genuine account of natality was the implications of our author’s 
respective views on temporality as aligned with invisibility.  Having outlined an exposed 
and shared temporal absence of the present between Merleau-Ponty (a “quasi-eternity” of 
lived instants between times exchanged) and Arendt (the eternity of the nunc stans), 
comparison of their synonymous temporal structure yielded a shared sense of divergence 
or decentering indicative of the present as being a certain absence made metaphorically 
visible.   
Hence, the temporal invisibility constitutive of flesh as necessary for perception 
and institutional events in their very divergence was demonstrated as convergent with the 
since shifted and metaphorically returned point of cyclical completion found in Arendt; 
from that normally invisible physis made visible by action’s natal intersection with the 
cyclicality of nature to the invisibility of the thinking ego, the noēsis noēseōs in its 
cyclical and mnemonic return of that which had already passed - a metaphor indicative of 
the birth of being and the present appearing “like a miracle.” (HC 246)   
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With these analogous dynamics for the emergence of the new from invisibility 
and with these commensurate temporal structures outlining the present in its invisible 
absence, both action and institution were shown to harbor miraculous natal newness.  
Indeed, birth, like the act of promise that initiates institution and outlines what it will 
return to the world, was shown as satisfying the preconditions for action to intersect with 
nature’s cyclical return in a spectacular revealing appearance – the birth of being as a 
kind of returned metaphor comparable to the noēsis noēseōs of thought.   
Because birth necessarily occurred in plurality, emerged in-between men, and 
commenced the disclosure to the question of “who?”, birth was seen as an upsurge within 
the inter esse or a passing into flesh by bearing the former’s structure of dissemination 
within a web of plurality.  Like the “who” witnessed only by others, birth is paradoxically 
one’s own and yet never an event witnessed in one’s life - an invisible origin never fully 
appropriable and an unconscious recess carried through subsequent institutional sequels 
in a re-birth where we find ourselves through others.  Foundational for all subsequent 
invisibilities in our differentiated and unfolding visible present, and as an invisible origin 
carried through into our present in its very absence, our birth as the flesh from which we 
pass is always the unfolding into the Merleau-Pontyan flesh of those others whose 
appearance in anticipatory ek-stasis was like a lifelong preparation for our arrival. 
Existentially speaking, this carried paradox of our birth (a non-event that is ours 
by being an event for other’s) allowing for an intercourse with the ek-stasis of others, 
meant that experienced “re-births” through an exposed temporal interiority reconfigured 
the institutional significance of our lives, showed us as both inside and outside of 
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ourselves in an established temporal equilibrium between preceding others in their 
institutions and the actions and thoughts we can perform amongst others in the now.   
We can now recall Goethe from earlier when he lamented Rome’s laterally laden 
epochs and a difficulty “...to decipher how Rome follows on Rome, and not only the new 
on the old, but also the various epochs within the old and new Rome on one another.”74  
But indeed, speaking of this multi-layered Rome as a kind of cultural origin he continued: 
“From this vantage point, history especially is read differently...In other places one reads 
from the outside in; here we imagine we are reading from the inside-out – everything lies 
spread around us and also extends out from us.”75 It is these two reflections taken in 
tandem, that allowed us to borrow a second natal description taken from the workings of 
institution: “...and I count the day when I entered Rome as my second natal day, a true 
rebirth...This rebirth, which is remolding me from within.”76   
Indeed, what Goethe had discovered was that time which other’s had left open for 
him and which something in his very being invited.  To be sure Goethe was not able to 
restore the time in question by taking advantage of his decentered present position.  
Rather, as we have noted, this decentering indicative of institution is possible only 
because we are always institutionalized, because, by virtue of our reconfigured and 
stretching ek-stases we are not enclosed in our own time:  “Our time provides us with the 
resources of communication with the past precisely when we do justice to its difference.” 
                                                 
74
 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Trans. Robert R. Heitner, “Italian Journey” in Goethe: The Collected Work  (New 
York, NY: Princeton University Press, 1994), 107. 
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 Ibid. 107. 
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 Ibid. 109. 
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(IP xviii)  This justice is not to fall back upon observed differences between them, to 
contest the times in the difference that emerged.  Rather, “[w]e will arrive at the universal 
not by abandoning our particularity, but by turning our particularity into a way of 
reaching others, by virtue of that mysterious affinity that makes situations mutually 
understandable.” (SNS 92)  That is to say, in his particularity, Goethe found an opened 
affinity, found himself drawn into what had been left open, and through these others 
found himself born again in the wonder of the world.  
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APPENDIX A 
Spanish Dancer
77
 
 
As on all is sides a kitchen match darts white 
Flickering tongue before it burst into flames: 
With the audience around her, quickened, hot, 
Her dance begins to flicker in the dark room. 
 
And all at once it is completely fire. 
 
One upward glance and she ignites her hair 
And, whirling faster and faster, fans her dress 
Into passionate flames, till it becomes a furnace 
From which, like startled rattlesnakes, the long 
Naked arms uncoil, around and clicking 
 
And then: as if the fire were too tight 
Around her body, she takes and flings it out 
Haughtily, with an imperious gesture, 
And watches: it lies raging on the floor, 
Still blazing up, and the flames refuse to die -. 
Till, moving with total confidence and a sweet 
Exultant smile, she looks up finally 
And stamps it out with powerful small feet. 
 
-Rainer Maria Rilke 
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